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Christopher R. Leslie* 
Predatory pricing is a two-step strategy for securing monopoly prof-
its. During the first step—the predation stage—a firm charges a price be-
low its costs in the hope of driving its competitors out of the market by 
forcing them to sell at a loss as well. If it succeeds, the firm can proceed 
to the second step—the recoupment stage. After it has the market to itself, 
the now-dominant firm charges a monopoly price in an effort to recoup 
the losses it sustained in the predation stage and to earn a steady stream 
of monopoly profits into the future.  
Predatory pricing violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, which pro-
hibits the use of anticompetitive conduct to acquire or maintain mono-
poly power. Predatory pricing is one form of anticompetitive conduct. 
Many judges and scholars, however, believe that predatory pricing does 
not occur because the two-step strategy combines significant up-front 
costs with a low probability of success. This skepticism has led courts to 
impose a recoupment element for section 2 predatory pricing claims. The 
recoupment element requires an antitrust plaintiff bringing a predatory 
pricing claim to prove that the defendant will be able to acquire monop-
oly power and to charge a monopoly price for long enough to make the 
whole scheme profitable. Antitrust liability becomes a function of the 
defendant’s profitability. 
This Article discusses the evolution of and rationale for the re-
coupment requirement. It shows how recoupment analysis by courts is 
often flawed, largely because judges incorrectly assume that market entry, 
which can prevent recoupment, is easy. This Article then illustrates the 
many ways in which recoupment can occur, including recoupment in 
other markets and recoupment through cartel or oligopoly pricing. 
Despite these various modes of recoupment, federal courts have sometimes 
structured the recoupment requirement in a way that is literally impossi-
ble to satisfy. This Article advocates more fine-tuned recoupment 
analysis.  
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After exploring the judicial misapplication of the recoupment re-
quirement, this Article challenges the underlying premises of the element 
by showing how predatory pricing can hurt consumers and competition 
even if a firm engaged in predatory pricing is unable to eventually 
recoup its losses. Ultimately, the recoupment requirement does not distin-
guish between anticompetitive and benign (or beneficial) conduct. This 
Article concludes by explaining how eliminating the recoupment re-
quirement in predatory pricing litigation would better serve the purposes 
of antitrust law. 
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Antitrust law condemns conduct and agreements that unreasonably 
restrain trade. The goal of antitrust law is to protect competition in the 
marketplace. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion breaking up 
Standard Oil over a century ago, antitrust law has been concerned with 
predatory pricing. In its most basic form, predatory pricing is a two-step 
strategy for securing monopoly profits. During the predation phase, the 
firm charges a price below its costs in the hopes that its competitors will 
be unwilling or unable to sustain the losses they would incur if they 
matched the below-cost price and will exit the market. After the rivals are 
vanquished, the post-predation phase begins. With the market to itself, 
the dominant firm charges a monopoly price with the goal of recouping 
the losses it sustained during the predation phase and then earning a 
steady stream of excess profits into the future.1 If executed successfully, 
this two-stage process can secure the predatory firm more money than it 
would get by vying for customers in a competitive marketplace. While no 
federal statute explicitly condemns predatory pricing, pricing below cost 
implicates several antitrust causes of action. First and foremost, predatory 
pricing may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits mo-
                                                                                                                 
1. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1384 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“Predatory pricing occurs when a company that controls a substantial market share lowers 
its prices to drive out competition so that it can charge monopoly prices, and reap 
monopoly profits, at a later time.”). 
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nopolization and attempted monopolization2—that is, a dominant firm’s 
use of anticompetitive conduct to acquire or maintain monopoly power 
in a relevant market.3 Predatory pricing qualifies as a form of 
anticompetitive conduct. Second, predatory pricing can implicate section 
1 of the Sherman Act when it is pursued jointly through an agreement 
among competitors. Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements 
that unreasonably restrain trade and, in theory, predatory pricing con-
spiracies violate section 1.4 Third, predatory pricing can also violate the 
Robinson-Patman Act. The Robinson-Patman Act condemns certain 
forms of price discrimination, such as when a firm charges a profitable 
price in one geographic market and a predatory price in another geo-
graphic market, using the profits from the first market to subsidize pre-
dation in the second.5 Most predatory pricing litigation is brought under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, which is the focus of this Article. 
Predatory pricing has long been a controversial cause of action in 
antitrust. Many judges and scholars believe that successful predatory pric-
ing simply does not occur because price predation is a high-risk strategy 
that entails significant up-front costs and a low likelihood of sustained 
profitability.6 This skepticism has led courts to impose a recoupment ele-
ment for section 2 predatory pricing claims. The recoupment element 
requires a predatory pricing plaintiff to prove that the defendant will be 
able to acquire monopoly power and charge a monopoly price long 
enough to make the whole scheme profitable. 
Since its creation in the 1980s, the recoupment requirement has 
been little scrutinized, which is surprising given that this lone element 
                                                                                                                 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
3. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (defining 
monopolization). Section 2 also condemns attempted monopolization when a firm with a 
significant market share and a specific intent to monopolize engages in anticompetitive 
conduct with a dangerous probability of monopolizing a relevant market. Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993) (articulating required elements of 
attempt to monopolize). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade . . . is declared to be illegal.”). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to 
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and 
quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition . . . .”); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963) 
(“The 1936 enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act was . . . aimed at a specific weapon of 
the monopolist—predatory pricing.”). 
6. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) 
(“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful.”); Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 
343 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court has urged great caution and a skeptical eye 
when dealing with unfair [predatory] pricing claims.”). 
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has effectively eliminated the viability of predatory pricing claims. After 
presenting the origins of the recoupment requirement, this Article ex-
plains why the recoupment element is both unnecessary and counter-
productive. To appreciate why the recoupment requirement is superflu-
ous, it is instructive to compare two scenarios: predatory pricing with re-
coupment and predatory pricing without recoupment. In Scenario 1, 
Firm A makes widgets and has two competitors. The average variable cost 
of making the product is $10 per unit. In an effort to eliminate its two 
competitors, Firm A reduces its price to $9 per unit. The two competitors 
remain in the market for two years before exiting the market entirely. 
During this time, Firm A sells two million units of product and racks up 
losses of approximately $2 million. After the competitors exit the market, 
Firm A begins charging a monopoly price, $11 per unit, and continues to 
sell one million units each year for three years until a new firm enters the 
market and bids the price back down to $10 per unit. Assume a discount 
rate of zero for simplicity, and the price predation seems like a profit-
maximizing strategy. During the monopoly period, Firm A earns $3 mil-
lion in monopoly profits. Firm A will have recouped its $2 million in-
vestment in predatory pricing in the first two years and received an addi-
tional $1 million in monopoly profits during the third year.  
In Scenario 2, all of the facts remain the same with one exception: 
Firm A reduces its price to $8 per unit. This means that its losses during 
the predation period total $4 million. After its competitors exit the 
market, Firm A will again earn $3 million in monopoly profits until a new 
rival enters the market and restores the competitive price. Firm A will not 
recoup its investment in predation and will instead lose $1 million 
despite its monopoly position for two years. 
In both scenarios, Firm A acquires monopoly power through preda-
tory pricing. The competitors suffer the same antitrust injury and con-
sumers in the post-predation period have paid the same monopoly over-
charges. Yet because of the recoupment requirement, Firm A has only 
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act in Scenario 1, not Scenario 2. This 
makes little sense because in both scenarios, Firm A has engaged in 
predatory pricing and has imposed the same injuries on its competitors 
and consumers. The failure to profit from anticompetitive conduct 
should not immunize that conduct from liability. 
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of and rationale for this 
recoupment requirement. It explains how courts imposed the recoup-
ment requirement in section 2 litigation through a misapplication of a 
section 1 case. Courts and commentators have justified the recoupment 
requirement as necessary to reduce the risk of an innocent firm being 
held liable for predatory pricing. Further, they argue that predatory pric-
ing harms neither consumers nor competition unless the predator 
recoups its investment in below-cost pricing.  
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Part II examines the recoupment requirement in operation. It ex-
plains how federal courts are often too quick to conclude that a defend-
ant could not recoup its investment in an alleged predatory pricing 
scheme. Part II examines the many ways that recoupment is possible—
ways that federal judges often fail to appreciate. In some cases, courts 
have structured the recoupment requirement in a way that is literally im-
possible to satisfy. The recoupment requirement has made it exceedingly 
difficult for predatory pricing claims to survive summary judgment. If the 
recoupment requirement is to serve its intended function, judges need to 
recognize the many ways that below-cost pricing can be profitable. 
Part III challenges the underlying premises of the recoupment re-
quirement. It shows how predatory pricing can hurt consumers and 
competition even without recoupment. In particular, consumers who 
purchase during the post-predation period when prices are supracompet-
itive suffer antitrust injury regardless of the monopolist’s profitability. 
Part III also examines the inefficiency inherent in price predation. 
Part IV advocates eliminating the recoupment requirement for mo-
nopolization claims based on predatory pricing. The primary justification 
for the recoupment requirement is to reduce the risk of false positives. 
Part IV explains how other screens for false positives are better than the 
recoupment element. It then shows how the recoupment requirement 
can create false negatives in antitrust litigation and explores the costs of 
this form of judicial error. Finally, it explains why the profitability of anti-
competitive conduct is generally irrelevant in antitrust jurisprudence. 
I. THE RECOUPMENT REQUIREMENT IN PREDATORY PRICING JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Evolution of the Recoupment Requirement 
The Supreme Court first recognized predatory pricing as an anti-
trust violation in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.7 In the following dec-
ades, antitrust plaintiffs enjoyed a high success rate in predatory pricing 
cases.8 Early courts did not require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant 
either recouped its investment in below-cost pricing or had a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
7. E.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 573, 573 (2012) [hereinafter Leslie, Standard Oil] (discussing Supreme Court’s 
condemnation of Standard Oil’s anticompetitive conduct, including predatory pricing).  
8. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory 
Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2250 (2000) [hereinafter 
Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing] (noting, prior to Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), “[p]laintiffs won most litigated 
cases”); James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The 
Emerging Trends, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 140–45 (1982) (observing higher degree of 
plaintiff success in pre-Brooke Group era of predatory pricing cases). 
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probability of doing so.9 Judicial and scholarly attention focused more on 
the appropriate measurement of cost for predatory pricing claims. In a 
famous article, Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner proposed a 
legal test based on average variable cost (AVC) being used as a proxy for 
marginal cost.10 Under this test, a price below AVC was presumed to be 
predatory while a price above AVC was presumed lawful. As courts 
adopted variations of the Areeda-Turner test, plaintiffs’ success rates 
fell.11  
The Supreme Court revisited the predatory pricing debate with its 
opinion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.12 In Matsu-
shita, American manufacturers of consumer electronics products brought 
a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, asserting that Japanese 
manufacturers of consumer electronics had conspired to charge preda-
torily low prices in the American market in order to drive American firms 
out of business.13 According to the complaint, after the Japanese firms 
had the American market to themselves, they would operate as a cartel in 
America, as they were doing in Japan.14 The Third Circuit held that 
plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judg-
ment.15 The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 opinion.16  
The Matsushita majority expressed skepticism about the rationality of 
predatory pricing conspiracies. The plaintiffs’ theory assumed that the 
defendants had collectively agreed to sustain losses for several years, and 
the Court reasoned that for this “investment to be rational, the conspira-
tors must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of 
later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.”17 The majority 
believed that recoupment was unlikely given that the predation would 
have to eliminate the American manufacturers from the market in order 
for the conspirators to be able to raise their prices, but this subsequent 
increase in price would encourage the eliminated manufacturers (or new 
                                                                                                                 
9. See Timothy J. Trujillo, Note, Predatory Pricing Standards Under Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions and Their Failure to Recognize Strategic Behavior as a Barrier to Entry, 
19 J. Corp. L. 809, 813 (1994) (noting in earlier period “[b]elow cost pricing plus 
anticompetitive intent appeared to be all that was necessary” to stake a claim). 
10. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 716–17 (1975) [hereinafter 
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing]. 
11. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2250–51, 2253. 
12. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
13. Id. at 577–78 (discussing plaintiffs’ theory of case). 
14. Id. at 584 (discussing respondents’ allegations of planned future cartelization in 
United States).  
15. Id. at 580.  
16. Id. at 582.  
17. Id. at 588–89. 
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ones) to reenter the market during the post-predation period.18 The 
Court claimed the existence of “a consensus among commentators that 
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely success-
ful.”19 These commentators had argued that a single monopolist would 
be unlikely to recoup the losses associated with predatory pricing.20 The 
Court noted that the Matsushita defendants would have to recoup 
through cartel pricing, which was even less likely given the inherent in-
stability of cartels.21 Asserting a low likelihood of recoupment, the Court 
held that the plaintiff’s theory of the case made “no practical sense”22 
and absent “evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the al-
leged conspirators acted independently,” the defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment.23 At its heart, the Matsushita opinion establishes a 
summary judgment standard for section 1 cases. If an alleged conspiracy 
appears irrational to the reviewing judge, the plaintiff must present more 
evidence to survive summary judgment. 
Matsushita was a section 1 case, involving an alleged conspiracy to re-
strain trade, and not a section 2 case; it involved no allegations of unilat-
eral anticompetitive conduct. Matsushita’s reasoning, nevertheless, 
wound its way into section 2 jurisprudence. In A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. (Rose Acre), the Seventh Circuit considered a case 
against a single seller accused of engaging in below-cost pricing in viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act as well as the Robinson-Patman 
                                                                                                                 
18. Id. at 589 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978); John S. 
McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 295–97 (1980)).  
19. Id.; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 121–22 n.17 (1986) 
(“Although the commentators disagree as to whether it is ever rational for a firm to 
engage in such conduct, it is plain that the obstacles to the successful execution of a 
strategy of predation are manifold, and that the disincentives to engage in such a strategy 
are accordingly numerous.”). 
20. Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 149–55 (1978) [hereinafter Bork, 
Paradox]; Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing, supra note 10, at 699; John S. McGee, 
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958) 
[hereinafter McGee, Standard Oil]; John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
Econ. 289, 292–94 (1980) [hereinafter McGee, Revisited]. 
21. 475 U.S. at 590–92. Cartels are inherently unstable for two related reasons. First, 
every member of the cartel has a strong incentive to cheat by charging less than the cartel 
price and stealing sales away from its cartel partners. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, 
Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1621, 1629–
30 (2008) (describing opportunities to maximize profit by cheating). Second, cartels often 
suffer from significant coordination problems as the conspirators negotiate price, 
production limits, market allocation, and enforcement mechanisms. See Herbert 
Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 813, 
825–34 (2011) (discussing coordination problems faced by prospective cartels). 
22. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. 
23. Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 
(1984)); see also Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 646 
(10th Cir. 1987) (“The [Matsushita] Court held that under these circumstances, the 
plaintiffs had failed to create a fact issue on the existence of a section 1 conspiracy.”). 
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Act.24 Writing for the court, Judge Frank Easterbrook asserted that Matsu-
shita’s “holding [was] that recoupment would be so unlikely that antitrust 
inquiry could not be justified.”25 He further cited Matsushita as standing 
for the proposition that “[b]ecause unsuccessful predation is unprofita-
ble, it is bootless for the legal system to intervene.”26 This misrepresents 
the Supreme Court’s holding: Matsushita did not hold that unprofitable 
predation is immune from antitrust liability. Rather, the Court held that 
the unlikelihood of recoupment meant that a jury in a section 1 case 
could not infer the presence of a conspiracy absent compelling evidence 
of an agreement.27 Matsushita had nothing to do with the standards for 
determining a section 2 violation. Judge Easterbrook never acknowl-
edged that Matsushita was a section 1 case about the level of evidence an 
antitrust plaintiff needs to survive summary judgment, not a section 2 
case on the elements necessary for liability. 
Judge Easterbrook incorrectly asserted that the Matsushita Court 
adopted a recoupment requirement for all predatory pricing cases.28 Alt-
hough the Matsushita Court itself noted that its observations about the 
difficulties of recoupment “apply even to predatory pricing by a single 
firm seeking monopoly power,”29 Judge Easterbrook converted Matsu-
shita’s observation about the difficulty of recoupment into a requirement 
that plaintiffs must prove recoupment in section 2 predatory pricing 
cases. The Rose Acre opinion held: “The investment must be recouped. If 
a monopoly price later is impossible, then the sequence is unprofitable 
and we may infer that the low price now is not predatory.”30 By sleight of 
hand, Judge Easterbrook held that if there is no likelihood of recoup-
ment, then there must not be any pricing below cost. Thus, a plaintiff’s 
failure to prove probability of recoupment entitled the defendant to 
summary judgment.  
Rose Acre was flawed, but prescient. The Supreme Court next consid-
ered predatory pricing in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.31 When Liggett found its share of the American tobacco market in 
decline, it began making and marketing low-priced generic cigarettes.32 
This action both took sales away from branded-cigarette manufacturers 
and constrained their ability to raise price.33 In reaction, Brown & 
                                                                                                                 
24. 881 F.2d 1396, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989). 
25. Id. at 1401. 
26. Id. (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595). 
27. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597–98.  
28. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401 (“Only if market structure makes recoupment feasible 
need a court inquire into the relation between price and cost.”). 
29. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590 (emphasis omitted).  
30. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401. 
31. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
32. Id. at 214.  
33. Id.  
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Williamson (B&W) began making generic cigarettes and undercutting 
Liggett’s price in that market.34 Liggett brought suit under the Robinson-
Patman Act, claiming that B&W was engaging in illegal predatory pric-
ing.35 Liggett did not claim that B&W was attempting to monopolize the 
market for generic cigarettes. Instead, Liggett claimed that B&W’s preda-
tory pricing was designed to pressure Liggett to “raise its list prices on 
generic cigarettes, so that the percentage price difference between ge-
neric and branded cigarettes would narrow. . . . The resulting reduction 
in the list price gap . . . would restrain the growth of the economy seg-
ment and preserve Brown & Williamson’s supracompetitive profits on its 
branded cigarettes.”36 According to Liggett’s theory, B&W would recoup 
its losses through oligopoly pricing37 in the branded cigarette market 
after the price of generic cigarettes rose and stopped constraining price 
increases in branded cigarettes.38 The district court overturned a jury ver-
dict in favor of Liggett. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.39 
The Supreme Court used Brooke Group as a vehicle for imposing a re-
coupment requirement in section 2 predatory pricing cases. The Court 
began by noting that although Liggett had brought its claim under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, the Court’s opinion would apply equally to preda-
tory pricing claims brought pursuant to section 2 of the Sherman Act.40 
Despite the different nomenclature,41 the Court reasoned that “the es-
sence of the claim under either statute is the same: A business rival has 
priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate or 
retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over prices in 
the relevant market.”42 Thus, the Court held that whether the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
34. Id. at 215.  
35. Id. at 216.  
36. Id. at 217. 
37. Oligopoly pricing occurs when competitors in a concentrated market tacitly raise 
their prices above competitive levels without explicitly communicating or fixing prices. 
Although the alleged recoupment mechanism involved multiple sellers, in contrast to the 
conspiracy allegations of Matsushita, Brooke Group involved one defendant accused of price 
predation. 
38. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 212. 
39. Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th 
Cir. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209. 
40. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222. The Court explained that the two antitrust 
provisions address the same problem because “primary-line competitive injury under the 
Robinson-Patman Act is of the same general character as the injury inflicted by predatory 
pricing schemes actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 221. 
41. Id. at 222 (“[W]e interpret § 2 of the Sherman Act to condemn predatory pricing 
when it poses ‘a dangerous probability of actual monopolization,’ whereas the Robinson-
Patman Act requires only that there be ‘a reasonable possibility’ of substantial injury to 
competition . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
U.S. 447, 455 (1993); Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 
(1983))).  
42. Id. 
2013] PREDATORY PRICING 1705 
  
“alleges predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act or . . . under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, two prerequisites to recovery remain the same.”43 
First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant charged prices that 
were “below an appropriate measure of its . . . costs.”44 Second, the plain-
tiff must establish recoupment by showing several steps, beginning with a 
showing that the “below-cost pricing [is] capable, as a threshold matter, 
of producing the intended effects on the firm’s rivals, whether driving 
them from the market, or . . . causing them to raise their prices to 
supracompetitive levels within a disciplined oligopoly.”45 If the target of 
the predation does not succumb, then the predator will not be able to 
enter the recoupment phase of the strategy.46 Assuming the defendant 
drives its rivals from the market, the predator must then be able to raise 
price in a sustained manner.47 The underlying premise of the predatory 
pricing claim is that the defendant is attempting to vanquish rivals 
through below-cost pricing in order to recoup the losses through mo-
nopoly pricing later.48 The Brooke Group majority opinion noted that 
“[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing 
scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from predation.”49 
The Court converted the defendant’s aspirations into the plaintiff’s bur-
den. In order to satisfy the recoupment element, the Brooke Group major-
ity held: 
The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood that 
the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above 
a competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for 
the amounts expended on the predation, including the time 
value of the money invested in it. As we have observed on a 
prior occasion, “[i]n order to recoup their losses, [predators] 
must obtain enough market power to set higher than competi-
tive prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to 
earn in excess profits what they earlier gave up in below-cost 
prices.”50 
After Brooke Group, the recoupment requirement became an estab-
lished element for predatory pricing claims brought under section 2 of 
                                                                                                                 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 225. 
46. See id. (“The inquiry is whether, given the aggregate losses caused by the below-
cost pricing, the intended target would likely succumb.”).  
47. Id. at 225–26.  
48. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing, supra note 10, at 698 (“[T]he classically-
feared case of predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the 
purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through higher 
profits earned in the absence of competition.”). 
49. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224. 
50. Id. at 225–26 (alterations in Brooke Group) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590–91 (1986)). 
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the Sherman Act.51 This created a unique burden for antitrust plaintiffs 
making predatory pricing claims. In general, section 2 requires the plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant acquired or maintained monopoly power 
through anticompetitive conduct. In predatory pricing cases, the re-
coupment requirement imposes an additional element that the monopo-
list generated sufficient monopoly profits to exceed its investment in an-
ticompetitive conduct. 
B. The Rationale Behind the Recoupment Requirement 
Courts and commentators have provided several related justifica-
tions for imposing a recoupment element in section 2 predatory pricing 
claims. First, the recoupment requirement is defended as a method of 
minimizing the risk of false positives. Second, several judges and scholars 
have argued that attempts at predatory pricing inflict no anticompetitive 
harm in the absence of recoupment. Third, the recoupment require-
ment is justified as an effective filter that lets judges avoid the more com-
plicated issues of intent and price-cost relationships. 
1. The Risk of False Positives. — A false positive exists if a defendant is 
found liable when, in fact, it has not violated the law. The section 2 cause 
of action for predatory pricing creates the risk of false positives because 
an efficient firm that can lower its cost of production and then pass those 
savings on to consumers should be rewarded with a higher market share, 
not punished with an antitrust lawsuit. When an inefficient firm loses 
sales to a competing firm that charges a lower price, the firm with dimin-
ishing market share may be tempted to accuse its rival of pricing below 
cost.52 Because inefficient rivals may take advantage of a legal standard 
                                                                                                                 
51. See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 900 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“As the Supreme Court explained in Brooke Group, a plaintiff in a single product 
predatory pricing case must establish that the defendant priced below cost and that there 
was a probability the defendant could recoup the losses it suffered during the predation 
period.”); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining “[t]o succeed, such a [predatory pricing] claim must demonstrate . . . that the 
alleged monopolist has a reasonable chance of recouping the losses through below-cost 
pricing” (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222–24)); Nat’l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt 
Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff must prove . . . ‘that the 
competitor had . . . a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost 
prices.’” (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222–24)); Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. 
Caribbean Petrol. Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 191 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[T]he plaintiff must show that 
the predator stands some chance of recouping his losses.”). 
52. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition, 28 J.L. & Econ. 247, 255 (1985) (claiming less efficient firms “advocate their 
[own] costing approach . . . to limit the price-cutting opportunities” of rivals made more 
efficient through “legitimate sources of superiority”); Michael L. Denger & John A. 
Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 Antitrust L.J. 541, 541 (1994) 
(noting difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate and predatory low pricing may 
encourage false antitrust allegations by competitors). 
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for predatory pricing that is either too vague or too liberal,53 courts must 
be able to distinguish between beneficial, procompetitive price cuts and 
predatory, anticompetitive price cuts. Courts may find it difficult to make 
this distinction because, as the Supreme Court has noted, “the mecha-
nism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is 
the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition.”54 If judges 
are not careful, predatory pricing “can easily be confused with merely low 
prices which benefit customers.”55 
Courts in antitrust cases endeavor to reduce the number of false pos-
itives because false positives punish innocent firms and can distort busi-
ness decisions. A false positive in predatory pricing litigation—when a 
defendant is found liable for illegal monopolization through predatory 
pricing when it has in fact been charging a price above cost—means that 
an efficient firm is penalized for engaging in beneficial conduct.56 If anti-
trust law were to improperly condemn harmless or beneficial price re-
ductions, “[r]isk averse firms in particular might avoid legitimate pricing 
strategies out of fear of prosecution or litigation.”57 Ironically, an overly 
broad predatory pricing regime could “‘chill the very behavior the anti-
trust laws seek to promote.’”58 In theory, this could prevent markets from 
operating efficiently.59 Ultimately, consumers are made worse off as the 
                                                                                                                 
53. See Peter C. Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courts: Reflection on Two 
Decisions, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 928, 938 (1986) (arguing inefficient competitors can 
make anticompetitive use of vague predatory pricing standards). 
54. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 (1986); see also 
Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Economic reality is that, 
generally, price reduction is the very essence of competition. Thus, care must be taken in 
drawing the line between pricing that enhances competition and predatory pricing that is 
designed to eliminate competition.”). 
55. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1080 (1st Cir. 1993). 
56. See, e.g., Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(“Predatory pricing claims, because they are premised on a temporary increase in 
competition, inherently ask the court to penalize potentially beneficial conduct.”). 
57. Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic 
Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 738, 790 (1981). 
58. Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also United States v. AMR Corp., 
335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Chicago scholars argued that lowering prices could 
only be pro-competitive and any prohibition on such conduct could ultimately deter firms 
from engaging in conduct that is socially beneficial.” (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Post-
Chicago Ready for the Courtroom? A Response to Professor Brennan, 69 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1103, 1106 (2001))); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir. 
1995) (noting “danger of chilling competition” through “[e]rroneous jury verdicts for 
plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases”). 
59. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A] 
legal precedent or rule of law that prevents a firm from unilaterally cutting its prices risks 
interference with one of the Sherman Act’s most basic objectives: the low price levels that 
one would find in well-functioning competitive markets.”). 
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fear of predatory pricing liability keeps prices artificially higher than they 
otherwise would be.60 
Courts have justified the recoupment requirement as reducing false 
positives. Federal judges have surmised that the Supreme Court created 
the recoupment requirement “to distinguish aggressive but competitive 
price cutting (assumed to be good for competition and consumers) from 
predatory, anti-competitive price cutting (assumed to be ultimately bad 
for consumers and competition).”61 If judges can accurately use a firm’s 
inability to recoup as a proxy for whether the defendant firm would have 
undertaken a strategy of pricing below cost, the argument goes, this 
could reduce false positives. As the Fifth Circuit explained, “[i]f there is 
no likelihood of recoupment, it would seem improbable that a scheme 
would be launched. Given the high error cost of finding companies liable 
for cutting prices to the consumer, the court should thus refuse to infer 
predation.”62 Thus, in the name of stopping false positives, Judge 
Easterbrook’s supposition in Rose Acre has triumphed: If the judge does 
not believe that recoupment is likely, then the defendant must not have 
priced below its cost.63 
2. No Anticompetitive Harm Absent Recoupment. — Courts also justify the 
recoupment requirement by arguing that absent recoupment, pricing 
below cost harms neither consumers nor competition. For example, 
courts have reasoned that “[p]redatory pricing is only harmful when the 
predator succeeds in recouping the losses it suffered by its earlier below-
cost pricing.”64 Most courts treat an attempt at predatory pricing as 
beneficial to consumers and as having no anticompetitive consequences 
so long as it fails to generate a net profit for the predator. 
                                                                                                                 
60. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Indeed, there is 
a real danger in mislabeling such practices as predatory, because consumers generally 
benefit from the low prices resulting from aggressive price competition.”). 
61. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602–03 (S.D. 
Ohio 1999); see also Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 224 (1993) (“Without [recoupment], predatory pricing produces lower aggregate 
prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.”); Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 
152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Absent the reasonable possibility of success in 
such recoupment, below-cost pricing cannot be anticompetitive because a failed predatory 
pricing scheme only results in lower aggregate prices for the consumer, again, a pro-
competitive outcome.”); Chris Sagers, “Rarely Tried, and . . . Rarely Successful”: 
Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among the Airlines, 74 J. Air L. & Com. 919, 928 
n.44 (2009) (noting common view of commentators that predatory pricing “will ordinarily 
be very hard to distinguish from legitimate price competition, and will impose no social 
harm unless recoupment succeeds”). 
62. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999). 
63. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 
1989) (noting “[o]nly if market structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire 
into the relation between price and cost”). 
64. W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
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a. No Consumer Harm. — Predatory pricing is a two-stage strategy. 
During the predation stage, the predator cuts price below cost in order 
to drive competitors from the market or to compel them to succumb to 
its demands—be they to raise price or reduce certain sales. During the 
recoupment stage, the predator acts like a monopolist: raising price, re-
ducing output, and converting consumer surplus into producer surplus. 
The conventional wisdom holds that consumers benefit during the pre-
dation stage and are harmed only during the recoupment stage. 
Several courts have reasoned that price predators who fail to recoup 
create a boon for consumers. For example, in Rose Acre, Judge 
Easterbrook wrote, “Price less than cost today, followed by the competi-
tive price tomorrow, bestows a gift on consumers. Because antitrust laws 
are designed for the benefit of consumers, not competitors, a gift of this 
kind is not actionable.”65 The Supreme Court echoed this rationale in 
Brooke Group when it opined that without recoupment, “predatory pricing 
produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is 
enhanced.”66 Courts have thus reasoned that, absent recoupment, anti-
trust law should embrace the gift of below-cost prices for consumers, not 
condemn it.67 
b. No Competitive Harm. — During the predation stage—before re-
coupment is attempted—the predator’s rivals could be injured in one of 
two ways. If they match the predator’s price, they may incur losses on 
each sale made. If they decline to match the loss-inducing price, they 
may lose sales as consumers take advantage of the below-cost pricing by 
the predator. Even a more efficient competitor can find itself losing sales 
and money to a price predator. 
Despite this injury to efficient rivals, courts and commentators argue 
that in the absence of recoupment, no anticompetitive harm takes place. 
Some commentators have suggested that the predator’s competitors “suf-
fer no antitrust injury until they are actually driven from the market.”68 
Even when rivals leave the market, however, courts hold that the preda-
                                                                                                                 
65. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted). 
66. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224; see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 
U.S. 328, 340 (1990) (“Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are 
set . . . .”); Michael L. Freedman, Note, Predatory Pricing After Brook Group: Economic 
Goals Prevail [sic], 58 Alb. L. Rev. 243, 253 (1994) (“Without the possibility of 
recoupment, below-cost pricing results in enhanced consumer welfare and will not be 
discouraged by the courts.” (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224–25)). 
67. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Such futile below-cost pricing effectively bestows a gift on consumers, and the Sherman 
Act does not condemn such inadvertent charity.”). 
68. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and 
Economic Issues 27 (2d ed. 2010). 
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tion does not have antitrust consequences absent recoupment.69 Courts 
make a distinction between injury to competitors and injury to competi-
tion, with only the latter being an antitrust concern.70 For example, the 
majority in Brooke Group opined that even though “below-cost pricing may 
impose painful losses on its target,” this “is of no moment to the antitrust 
laws if competition is not injured.”71 The injury to competition is decou-
pled from the elimination of competitors and is instead tethered to the 
probability of recoupment.72 For example, the Tenth Circuit held that 
“[w]ithout a dangerous probability of recoupment, competition remains 
unharmed even if individual competitors suffer.”73 In short, the prevail-
ing view is that in the absence of recoupment, predatory pricing “has no 
anticompetitive consequences.”74 
3. Recoupment as Efficient Filter. — The third justification for the re-
coupment requirement involves the administrability of antitrust rules. 
Like all elements of a cause of action, the recoupment requirement op-
erates as a screen to distinguish beneficial or benign conduct from harm-
ful conduct.75 The supporters of the recoupment requirement argue that 
this element is particularly useful because it saves courts from having to 
examine other elements of a predatory pricing claim. According to this 
line of thinking, if the alleged predation seems unprofitable, then a ra-
                                                                                                                 
69. See, e.g., Wallace v. IBM, 467 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When exit does 
not occur, or recoupment is improbable even if some producers give up the market, there 
is no antitrust problem.”). 
70. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) 
(“[A]ntitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors . . . .’” 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))); see also Rebel Oil 
Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Though rivals may suffer 
financial losses or be eliminated as a result of the below-cost pricing, injury to rivals at this 
stage of the predatory scheme is of no concern to the antitrust laws.”). 
71. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224. 
72. See Advo, 51 F.3d at 1200 (“Predatory pricing schemes that fail at the recoupment 
stage may injure specific competitors . . . but do not injure competition (i.e. they do not 
injure consumers) and so produce no antitrust injury.” (citing Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 
487–90)). 
73. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Kelly J. 
Fox, Note, Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: Taking the Predator out 
of Predatory Pricing, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 581, 590 (1994) (“The recoupment analysis 
focuses upon the premise that no antitrust injury to competition occurs unless there exists 
a high likelihood that the alleged predatory firm will recoup the expenses and lost profits 
expended during the period of predation.” (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986))). 
74. M. Steven Wagle, Predatory Pricing, A Case Study: Matsushita Electric Industries Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation [sic], 22 Creighton L. Rev. 89, 119 (1988).  
75. See 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 726a, at 57–58 
(3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he substantive evil that antitrust reprehends is not the injury to rivals, 
but the subsequent injury to consumers. The recoupment requirement enables the 
tribunal to determine whether a particular price cut is calculated to injure only rivals, or 
consumers as well.”). 
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tional firm would not have attempted it, so it must not have happened.76 
For example, in Rose Acre, Judge Easterbrook justified the recoupment 
requirement in large part as a way to avoid having to evaluate the pricing-
below-cost element.77 Judge Easterbrook asserted that if the only reason 
for a firm to engage in below-cost pricing is to recoup the investment 
later, then it must follow that if there is no likelihood of recoupment, the 
firm must not be pricing below cost.78 Other courts have followed suit.79 
Recoupment was not seen as merely another element, equal to all 
others. Instead, recoupment was elevated to a threshold element: The 
plaintiff’s failure to prove probability of recoupment eliminated the need 
to consider either the appropriate measure of cost or whether the de-
fendant actually priced below that measure.80 This view was justified on 
the grounds that recoupment is an easier element to apply than the 
price-below-cost element.81 
Courts and commentators also praise the recoupment requirement 
as a convenient filter to avoid all inquiries into intent in predatory pric-
ing cases. Some jurisdictions treat predatory intent as an element of the 
                                                                                                                 
76. See, e.g., Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 
F.2d 582, 599 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Therefore, ‘[a]ccepting rational economic conduct as the 
standard for predation,’ we assume that predatory conduct will be undertaken only when 
success is plausible.” (alteration in Lomar) (quoting Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 
1345 (8th Cir. 1987))); Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 
2263 (“The recoupment requirement was designed to screen out cases where predation 
appeared unprofitable and hence irrational.”). 
77. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (“It is much easier to determine from the structure of the market that 
recoupment is improbable than it is to find the cost a particular producer 
experiences . . . . Market structure offers a way to cut the inquiry off at the pass . . . .”). 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Irvin Indus., Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 974 F.2d 241, 244 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (“Moreover, if the market structure renders recoupment of profits lost during 
the price cut phase difficult or risky, it may be unlikely that the seller’s price cut is 
predatory.”). 
80. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725b, at 50–51 (“Some have 
suggested that the recoupment requirement ‘trumps’ or takes precedence over the 
requirement of prices below cost . . . .”). 
81. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to 
Clarify Predation Policy, in The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy 
502, 518 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Antitrust 
Revolution, 4th ed.] (“Judge Frank Easterbrook suggested in Rose Acre . . . that sacrifice is 
not worth even looking for if recoupment seems very unlikely. He argues that it is often 
easier to see that market structure makes recoupment unlikely than to decide if there was 
a sacrifice.”); Jessica L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: 
The Rose Acre Recoupment Test and the Search for an Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1781 (1991) (“Judge Easterbrook, in supporting his use of 
recoupment ability as the appropriate judicial ‘filter’ for predatory pricing claims, asserts 
that determining whether recoupment is possible is easier than determining a business’ 
costs.”). 
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predatory pricing offense.82 When the charge of predatory pricing is 
brought in the form of an attempted monopolization claim, the plaintiff 
must prove a specific intent to monopolize. Although many antitrust vio-
lations include some variation of an intent requirement, the intent ele-
ment is nevertheless often disparaged as difficult to apply and interpret 
in the context of predatory pricing.83 In Rose Acre, Judge Easterbrook ar-
gued that “unless recoupment lies in store even the most vicious intent is 
harmless to the competitive system.”84 Because recoupment is seen as the 
only way in which predatory pricing could inflict antitrust injury, any in-
quiry into predatory intent is considered superfluous and “irrelevant” if 
recoupment is unlikely.85 
In short, the recoupment requirement lets courts avoid inquiries 
into both price and intent.86 This is seen as increasing the efficiency of 
antitrust litigation. As one commentator explained, the recoupment el-
ement is “a filter to reduce the timely and expensive discovery and litiga-
tion associated with predatory pricing claims. If the recoupment analysis 
proves futile, there would be no need to inquire into the cost/price anal-
ysis or predatory intent of the parties, as these would not lead to competi-
tive injury.”87 
  
                                                                                                                 
82. See infra Part IV.A.3 (surveying jurisdictional variations on predatory intent 
element). 
83. See, e.g., Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting “futility 
in attempting to discern predatory conduct solely through evidence of a defendant’s 
‘predatory intent’”). 
84. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
85. Page I. Austin, Predatory Pricing Law Since Matsushita, 58 Antitrust L.J. 895, 899 
(1990) (“If recoupment is impossible, then the defendant’s state of mind also becomes 
irrelevant.”); John B. Schulte, Note, Predatory Pricing: The Retreat from Subjective Intent 
Analysis and the Move Toward a Likelihood of Recoupment Inquiry, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
975, 1007 (1990) (“Also, if recoupment is stressed at the outset, the need to search for 
intent, assuming arguendo intent was relevant, may become meaningless; if recoupment is 
impossible, intent is irrelevant.”); William L. Worden, Case Note, Antitrust: Predatory 
Pricing, 40 Drake L. Rev. 657, 668 (1991) (“Making recoupment an initial hurdle avoids 
questions of cost and intent, because if a price below cost is lawful when it cannot lead to 
monopoly, then the defendant’s intent is irrelevant.”); see also supra Part I.B.2.b 
(discussing general assumption of no competitive harm absent recoupment). 
86. Schulte, supra note 85, at 1007–08 (“Determining from the structural 
characteristics of the relevant market whether eventual recoupment is possible is easier to 
determine than either attaching significance to evidence of intent or discovering the 
pertinent product cost and price-cost relation for an alleged predator.”). 
87. Fox, supra note 73, at 604 (citing Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1400); see also Schulte, 
supra note 85, at 1007 (“Such an initial analysis will also shorten the time and reduce the 
complication of antitrust litigation.”). 
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C. Summary 
The importation of the recoupment requirement into predatory 
pricing law results from courts confusing the evidentiary standards for 
section 1 claims with the substantive elements of section 2 claims. The 
Matsushita Court explored recoupment in the context of section 1 litiga-
tion as evidence of whether the alleged conspiracy—to charge a preda-
tory price—was plausible.88 The Justices wrestled with the sole question of 
whether there was sufficient evidence of an agreement among the 
Japanese manufacturers.89 In the context of section 1 concerted preda-
tory pricing claims, if there is no likelihood of recoupment then courts 
are less likely to infer the existence of an agreement among competitors 
to engage in predatory pricing.90 Unfortunately, subsequent courts ap-
plied the Matsushita standard for section 1 conspiracy cases to summary 
judgment motions in section 2 predatory pricing litigation.91 This ap-
proach is flawed because section 2 predatory pricing claims are not pred-
icated on the presence of an agreement. In order to prevail on a section 
2 monopolization claim, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant 
has monopoly power in a relevant market and acquired (or maintained) 
that power through anticompetitive conduct.92 Thus, while the likelihood 
of recoupment changes how much weight to give ambiguous evidence of 
an agreement in section 1 cases, this issue should be irrelevant in section 
2 cases. 
II. COURTS ROUTINELY ERR IN APPLYING THE RECOUPMENT REQUIREMENT 
Courts often reject predatory pricing claims because the plaintiff 
failed to prove a probability of recoupment to the court’s satisfaction.93 
Unfortunately, in many of these cases, the court incorrectly analyzed the 
issue of recoupment. This Part exposes mistakes that courts make and 
explores the myriad ways in which predators recoup their investments in 
below-cost pricing. 
  
                                                                                                                 
88. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590–91 (1986) 




91. See, e.g., C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 
1996) (granting summary judgment motion on predatory pricing claims based in part 
upon failure to meet “heightened pleading requirements of Matsushita”). 
92. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). Private plaintiffs 
must also show that they have suffered antitrust injury. See infra Part IV.A.4 (discussing 
causal antitrust injury). 
93. See infra note 265 (discussing line of cases articulating necessity of “dangerous 
probability” of recoupment). 
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A. Judicial Misperceptions in Analyzing Recoupment 
Judicial decisions finding no probability of recoupment are often 
riddled with unfounded assumptions and misunderstandings of how 
markets work. This section examines three mistakes that judges make in 
predatory pricing cases: assuming easy entry into markets; misunder-
standing capital markets; and distorting the timing issues related to re-
coupment. 
1. Entry Assumptions. — In applying the Brooke Group dicta that if 
entry is easy then recoupment is implausible,94 lower courts are too quick 
to assume that market entry is, in fact, easy. For example, in Stearns 
Airport Equipment Co. v. FMC Corp., the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment against a predatory pricing plaintiff, reasoning that recoup-
ment was unlikely because foreign suppliers could enter the market.95 To 
reach this conclusion, the court derided the plaintiff because the “only 
specific barriers to foreign entry mentioned” were “transportation costs, 
manufacturing costs, and the demonstrated ability of the dominant firm 
to charge supracompetitive prices.”96 The court failed to recognize that 
these are—or suggest—barriers to entry. The court rejected transporta-
tion costs as a barrier to entry for foreign producers because domestic 
producers also face shipping costs.97 The court dismissed “the historical 
lack of success foreign firms have had in the domestic market,” which the 
plaintiff argued suggested the presence of entry barriers, as “irrelevant.”98 
Furthermore, the court discounted the plaintiff’s argument for failing to 
prove the existence of “unusual barriers to entry in the . . . [relevant] 
market.”99 The court never explained why a barrier to entry must be 
“unusual” in order to support the possibility of recoupment. The court 
ultimately reasoned that the antitrust plaintiff proved too much because 
“[n]ew entrants to a market will always face these kinds of entry costs.”100 
In other words, according to the Fifth Circuit, because barriers to entry 
always exist, such barriers do not exist as a matter of antitrust law.  
But ubiquity is not a reason to deny something’s existence; rather, it 
is a reason to take it seriously. The court concluded that “it would not 
                                                                                                                 
94. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 
(1993) (“[W]here new entry is easy . . . summary disposition of the case is appropriate.”). 
95. 170 F.3d 518, 536 (5th Cir. 1999).  
96. Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
97. Id. at 530–31. The court also noted that the defendant shipped its product 
abroad. Id. at 520.  
98. Id. at 530; see also Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, 
Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 482, 554 (2002) (arguing courts 
should consider “lack of entrant penetration into the market, the absence of large-scale 
entry, and the absence of innovative entry” when evaluating ease of entry in predation 
cases). 
99. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 531 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. 
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seem unreasonable to assume” that entry would occur once the defend-
ant began to raise price in the post-predation period.101 This is com-
pletely inappropriate because at the summary judgment stage all evi-
dence, including that relating to the existence of barriers to entry, 
should be read in favor of the nonmovant, the antitrust plaintiff. In es-
sence, the Fifth Circuit simply assumed away the probability of recoup-
ment. Courts assume that if entry appears easy, then any attempt at re-
coupment is “doomed to failure.”102 For example, in Advo, the Third Cir-
cuit declared that it would be easy to enter the market for assembling 
and distributing advertising circulars.103 The Third Circuit asserted that 
“[a]ny attempt to earn back the foregone profits by charging monopoly 
prices on distribution of circular advertising . . . merely will lead to a wave 
of new entrants who will drive prices down to competitive levels.”104 But 
the facts showed that Advo charged a monopoly price for years before 
entry occurred.105 Thus, while entry was theoretically easy, it was actually 
more complicated. 
Some commentators argue that recoupment is unlikely because ri-
vals who exit the market in response to below-cost pricing will reenter 
when the monopolist raises price in the post-predation period.106 There 
are, however, many markets which, once exited, are relatively difficult to 
reenter. For example, reentry did not occur in the airline industry when 
a dominant carrier raised price after defeating an upstart airline with 
predatory pricing.107 Similarly, grocery stores driven from the market in 
response to predatory pricing would have to incur significant costs in or-
der to reopen, including “the cost of rehiring employees or rebuilding 
the loyalty of angry customers.”108 In many industries, “[s]alvaged equip-
ment, dispersed labor force and management, discontinued advertising, 
and unmaintained reputation can only be replaced or re-adapted to their 
                                                                                                                 
101. Id. 
102. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1995). 
103. Id. (“The inputs required are readily available: a small cadre of experienced 
managers; a sales force; computerized address lists available from a variety of vendors; and 
a large number of low-skill employees to stuff circulars into packets, and then either to 
stuff them into newspapers or hang them on doorknobs.”). 
104. Id. at 1203 (citation omitted). 
105. Id. at 1201. 
106. See, e.g., Bork, Paradox, supra note 20, at 151–52 (discussing possibility of 
predation victim avoiding losses by closing operations until reentry is feasible); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1984) (discussing likelihood of 
competition from “resurgent firms”); McGee, Standard Oil, supra note 20, at 140 (asserting 
possibility of reentry).  
107. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predatory Practices & Monopolization in the Airline 
Industry: A Case Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 Transp. L.J. 129, 159–60 (2002) 
(discussing Northwest Airlines’s predatory dominance in Minneapolis/St. Paul market and 
absence of reentry by airlines chased out of market). 
108. Richard Craswell & Mark R. Fratrik, Predatory Pricing Theory Applied: The 
Case of Supermarkets vs. Warehouse Stores, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1985). 
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former uses at substantial costs. Such costs constitute re-entry barriers.”109 
In short, reentry is not as easy as some courts would make it out to be. 
Even when entry (or reentry) seems theoretically easy, it may not 
occur for several reasons. First, the higher post-predation price need not 
necessarily induce entry because the successful predator can employ limit 
pricing. Limit pricing refers to setting “price at a level just below that 
which a prospective entrant to the market would need to charge in order 
to sustain a successful entry.”110 In theory, the supracompetitive price can 
be set at a level that allows recoupment to occur at a reasonable pace 
without provoking entry, which would drive the price down.111 In this 
manner, a dominant firm may use predatory pricing to drive out a com-
petitor and charge a supracompetitive price that is too small to attract 
new entrants, yet high enough to recoup its losses and then some. 
Second, monopoly prices need not attract entry. Even if a monopoly 
price would allow a new entrant to recover the start-up costs, the would-
be entrant could calculate that its entry into the market would depress 
the price and its actual rate of return would be insufficient to recover its 
entry costs in a timely manner.112 Consequently, a dominant firm could 
charge a monopoly price without inviting entry if potential entrants be-
lieved that the price would fall upon their entry and that that lower price 
would make entry insufficiently profitable. 
Finally, even if entry does occur, it need not prevent recoupment. 
For example, the entry may be too small to compel the dominant firm to 
reduce price.113 Professor Avishalom Tor has argued that “mere evidence 
of entry should not be sufficient to reject predatory pricing claims out of 
hand. Instead, the courts should focus on the success of entrants in pene-
trating the market as a better indicator of the short-term competitive 
threat such entrants pose for allegedly predatory incumbents.”114 A new 
entrant may enjoy the price umbrella created by the monopolist, taking a 
small slice of the market while also charging the monopoly price. This 
                                                                                                                 
109. Wagle, supra note 74, at 96 (citing Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An 
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8, 11–12 
(1981)). 
110. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 1988). 
111. See Carstensen, supra note 53, at 962–63 (showing how more “modest” markup 
during recoupment phase of predatory pricing “may make new entry far less attractive 
given the significant short-run costs that any new competition would have to incur”). 
112. See, e.g., Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 408 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (noting low rate of return could lead firms to “think twice” about reentry 
despite relative ease of reentry), aff’d, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
113. See Tor, supra note 98, at 559 n.319 (describing FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 
F. Supp. 2d 34, 54–58 (D.D.C. 1998), as case finding “where larger-scale entry was unlikely 
to occur within the time frame set by the guideline, the existing potential for expansion by 
small ‘fringe’ firms was not sufficient to achieve the required impact on price”). 
114. Id. at 553 (emphasis omitted). 
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would reduce the monopolist’s revenue, but not dramatically so, and 
possibly not enough to prevent recoupment. 
2. Courts Misunderstand Capital Markets. — Some courts and commen-
tators argue that recoupment is improbable because the targets of price 
predation can readily secure financing to withstand the below-cost pric-
ing during the predation period or to reenter the market during the re-
coupment period.115 They argue that the targets of price predation can 
receive financing to compete against deep-pocketed predators.116  
Capital markets, however, are imperfect.117 Venture capitalists may 
avoid markets dominated by a price predator.118 Price predation can de-
plete the target’s funds available to meet loan commitments.119 Banks 
and venture capitalists may be unable to determine whether the target is 
suffering losses due to temporary predation or more durable inefficien-
cies.120 Either way, predation can discourage financing by creating uncer-
tainty.121 Indeed, some predators intend to send a message to their rivals’ 
                                                                                                                 
115. See, e.g., W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(finding capital costs not barrier to entry in predatory pricing case); AD/SAT, a Div. of 
Skylight, Inc. v. Assoc. Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding “cost of 
capital should not be considered in determining whether [defendant] has priced below 
average variable cost”); Caller-Times Publ’g Co. v. Triad Commc’ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 
593 n.24 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to recognize 
imperfections in capital markets and “lack of available credit arguably could serve as a 
barrier to entry”); see also Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common 
Law Evolution 223 (2003) (“If it is clear that in terms of economic fundamentals, the rival 
can compete against the monopolist, then the rival should be able to borrow funds that 
would allow it to withstand a lengthy predatory campaign.”); James A. Dalton & Louis 
Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-examination of the Trial Record, 
22 Res. L. & Econ. 155, 158 (2007) [hereinafter Dalton & Esposito, Re-examination] 
(noting McGee’s argument that capital markets would supply “efficient prey” with 
necessary funds to withstand predation). 
116. See George A. Hay, The Economics of Predatory Pricing, 51 Antitrust L.J. 361, 
363–64 (1982). 
117. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2286 
(explaining capital market imperfections); see also Richard T. Rapp, Predatory Pricing 
Analysis: A Practical Synthesis, 59 Antitrust L.J. 595, 597–98 (1991) (explaining relevance 
of capital market imperfections to market dominance). 
118. See Carstensen, supra note 53, at 966 (arguing venture capitalists will not enter 
market “unless the potential reward is great enough to outweigh additional risk” presented 
by predator). 
119. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2287. 
120. See id. at 2248 (“[B]anks observe the [fall in profits], but cannot tell whether it 
is caused by predation or inefficient performance . . . .”); see also John E. Kwoka, Jr. & 
Lawrence J. White, The Economic and Legal Context, in Antitrust Revolution, 4th ed., 
supra note 81, at 172, 181 [hereinafter Kwoka & White, Economic and Legal Context] 
(arguing many instances of alleged predation are simply hard competition from stronger 
firms). 
121. See Brodley & Hay, supra note 57, at 746 n.15 (“Financers do not know with 
certainty if the new entrant will progress down the textbook curve that illustrates declining 
costs as cumulative output increases. Thus, they may balk at underwriting large short run 
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bankers not to fund them.122 Furthermore, even if the target has access to 
capital, the losses imposed by predation may cause lenders to charge a 
premium.123 The losses inflicted by price predation cause lenders to 
tighten their terms,124 hobbling the rival’s ability to compete on the mer-
its. Insufficient access to outside capital can deny a target the means to 
withstand predation, even if it has the will.125 Despite the widespread aca-
demic awareness of capital market imperfection, courts do not consider 
the issue when asserting that targets can get money to survive predation 
or to reenter the market later.126 
3. Courts Confuse Timing Issues. — Courts have made the recoupment 
requirement too difficult to satisfy by improperly analyzing the issue of 
duration. By assuming that the length of both the predation and the re-
coupment periods must be substantial,127 courts put plaintiffs in an 
impossible bind. Courts require predatory pricing plaintiffs to prove that 
“‘the extent and duration of the alleged predation’” were sufficient to 
drive all rivals from the market.128 If the extent of predation is relatively 
little, then courts hold that recoupment is “impossible” because a low 
                                                                                                                 
losses.”); James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth 
Paralleling Fact, 38 Rev. Indus. Org. 245, 251 (2011) (“Uncertainty about the costs of the 
potential entrant relative to the dominant firm as well as uncertainty about the incumbent 
firm’s reaction to entry diminishes the resolve of the potential entrant, as well as the 
willingness of the capital markets to supply funds.”). 
122. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Response to Critique and Further Elaboration, 89 Geo. L.J. 2495, 2509 (2001) [hereinafter 
Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response] (discussing example of Sacramento cable market). 
123. See Kwoka & White, Economic and Legal Context, supra note 120, at 181 
(noting lenders charge premiums to smaller firms because of favoritism toward larger 
firms, or because larger firms disrupt smaller rivals’ business prospects). 
124. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2287 
(“Finally, lower earnings may cause lenders to believe wrongly that the firm’s profits are 
likely to be lower or riskier in the future and therefore to stiffen their lending terms.”). 
125. See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic 
Perspective, 62 Antitrust L.J. 585, 591 n.27 (1994) (arguing predator has advantage in 
price war when target lacks access to capital). 
126. See id. at 597 (“Although it was obliged to interpret the record in the light most 
favorable to Liggett, the [Brooke Group] Court did not investigate the possibility of a capital 
market imperfection hobbling Liggett’s access to financing relative to that of Brown & 
Williamson.”). 
127. See, e.g., Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n 
order for the business entity to eliminate competition by pricing below cost, it must forego 
short-term profits long enough to drive competitors from the market and then maintain 
monopoly power long enough to recoup the losses and realize additional gain.”). 
128. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 529 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 
(1993)). 
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amount of below-cost pricing will be insufficient to drive competitors 
from the market.129  
In addition to requiring a lengthy period of predation, courts as-
sume that the duration of recoupment must be similar to the duration of 
predation. For example, in Matsushita, the Supreme Court opined that 
“because the alleged losses have accrued over the course of two decades, 
the conspirators could well require a correspondingly long time to re-
coup.”130 The Court then concluded that recoupment was too improba-
ble because it would take too long.131 The Court’s duration assumption is 
flawed. The monopoly profit margin in the recoupment period may of-
ten be higher than the loss margin during the predation period. For ex-
ample, after Northwest Airlines drove its rival, Kiwi International Airlines, 
from the market by matching the upstart’s $69 fare on the Minneapolis-
Detroit route, Northwest Airlines raised its fares to $467.132 Similarly, a 
predator could reduce prices by ten percent below cost during the pre-
dation phase and then charge a monopoly price that is 400 percent 
above cost during the recoupment phase. If that were to happen, re-
coupment would take significantly less time than predation. 
Courts have essentially created a Catch-22 regarding the duration of 
predation in which the antitrust plaintiff simply cannot succeed. If the 
predation lasts for a relatively short time, then the court will conclude 
that there is no exclusionary effect; if the predation lasts for a relatively 
long time, then the court will conclude that the predator cannot recoup 
as a matter of law.133 In theory, there is a sweet spot in which the duration 
                                                                                                                 
129. See Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(finding insufficient predation when only two-fifths of one percent of customers were lost 
over two-year period); Stearns, 170 F.3d at 529 (holding underpricing in five bids over four-
year period would not eliminate competitors from market); see also Denger & Herfort, 
supra note 52, at 552 (“[I]f challenged below-cost pricing is not sustained long enough to 
exclude or drive rivals out of the market or alter their pricing behavior appreciably, then it 
is not likely to create the type of competitive dangers that the prohibition against 
predatory pricing was designed to avert.”). 
130. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592 (1986). 
131. See id. at 592–93 (“If the losses have been substantial—as would likely be 
necessary in order to drive out the competition—petitioners would most likely have to 
sustain their cartel for years simply to break even.” (footnote omitted)). 
132. Dempsey, supra note 107, at 159. 
133. See William H. Jordan, Comment, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: The 
Problem of State “Sales Below Cost” Statutes, 44 Emory L.J. 267, 299 (1995) (“If the below-
cost pricing is merely a short-term promotion, then it cannot drive competitors from the 
market. On the other hand, a firm which prices its products below cost for an extended 
period of time may never be able to recoup its losses . . . .”). The Court created a bind 
where there is no duration of below-cost pricing that leads to antitrust liability: 
The Court also failed to address how long predatory pricing must exist for it to 
be actionable. If the below-cost pricing is merely a short-term promotion, then it 
cannot drive competitors from the market. On the other hand, a firm which 
prices its products below cost for an extended period of time may never be able 
to recoup its losses even if it should succeed in driving its rivals from the market. 
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of predation is neither too short nor too long and recoupment is hence 
possible, but the courts have given no indication of where this middle 
ground resides.134 
B. Courts Fail to Appreciate How Recoupment Actually Occurs 
Courts are quick to dismiss the probability of recoupment because 
they look for recoupment through a narrow lens and often not in the 
correct places. Because static analysis of the recoupment issue leads to 
false conclusions of no recoupment,135 this section employs dynamic 
analysis to demonstrate how predators recoup their investments in below-
cost pricing. While most observers may agree that the ability to recoup 
makes predatory pricing rational,136 not everyone recognizes the many 
forms that recoupment may take.  
1. Recoupment in Another Product Market. — In rejecting predatory 
pricing claims, some courts either assert or assume that any recoupment 
must take place in the specific market in which the below-cost pricing 
occurred.137 Courts apparently do not appreciate the prospect of recoup-
ment in another market.138 The source of this misconception may reside 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
134. For example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a predatory pricing claim because it was 
“unlikely that [the defendant] would be able to control prices for any meaningful period, 
because other competitors easily c[ould] enter the market,” but the court did not attempt 
to define this “meaningful period.” C.A.T. Indus. Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 
Inc., 884 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
135. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. 
L. Rev. 515, 527–28 (1985) (“Static analysis—determining whether the firm profited 
immediately by its price cut—would produce the misleading conclusion that predation was 
never profitable. One could only discover the potential profitability of this strategy by 
taking into account the dynamic effect on the firm’s market position.”). 
136. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 125, at 593–99 (noting Chicago and post-Chicago 
schools “differ on the plausibility of certain potential mechanisms for recoupment, not on 
the necessity of recoupment”). 
137. See, e.g., Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 526 (D.S.C. 1996) 
(finding relevant market for Sherman Act analysis to be monopolized market); Edlin & 
Farrell, supra note 81, at 519 (noting court in airline price predation case “was reluctant to 
consider recoupment in other markets”); see also McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 
F.2d 1487, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing requirement that business “‘must . . . recoup 
its losses in the particular communities where their commodities are sold below cost . . . by 
raising the price of the same class of commodities’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 63-698, at 3 
(1914))). 
138. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 724, at 39 (“There may be cases 
where a predator who makes more than one product or operates in more than one region 
selects only one for below-cost pricing but reaps recoupment benefits in all. . . . The courts 
have not dealt adequately with this problem.”); Trujillo, supra note 9, at 825 (“The . . . 
recoupment analysis in Matsushita, Cargill, and Brooke refers to recoupment only in the 
market in which the predation actually occurs. Thus, the Court’s analyses and test . . . 
ignore the possibility that successful predation could occur because the dominant firm can 
spread its gains from predation over several markets.” (footnote omitted)). 
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in the Chicago School’s assumption that if recoupment cannot happen 
in a single-product market, then it necessarily cannot occur in a multi-
product scenario.139 This section explains how recoupment can happen 
in markets for complements, substitutes, and replacement goods. 
a. Recoupment in Complementary Product Market. — Recoupment can 
take place in a complementary product market. If a firm sells two com-
plementary products, A and B, and has market power in B, but not A, it 
may profitably engage in predatory pricing in A while recouping in the 
market for B. In complementary product markets, a reduction in the 
price of one good will generally increase demand for the other.140 If the 
firm is charging a supracompetitive price for product B, then an increase 
in demand for B will increase the firm’s profits. The firm can accomplish 
this by charging a below-cost price for product A, which has the effect of 
potentially vanquishing other suppliers of A while increasing the profits 
earned in the market for B. In this manner, the predatory pricing in A 
can be both exclusionary and cost-effective.141 
Recoupment can also happen in a product market in which preda-
tion has not occurred when a firm monopolizes one market, but makes 
its profits in another market. The Microsoft case provides an example of 
this dynamic.142 Microsoft possessed monopoly power over operating sys-
tems, but worried that browser technology (namely, Netscape’s Navigator 
browser) might evolve in a manner that would make consumers and ap-
plication developers less dependent on Microsoft’s operating system.143 
Microsoft created its own browser, Internet Explorer (IE), and sought to 
dominate the browser market in order to prevent browser technology 
from advancing and undermining Microsoft’s monopoly over operating 
systems.144 
                                                                                                                 
139. See McGee, Revisited, supra note 20, at 326 (“I said very little about multiple-
product firms. If we cannot get the principles straight for single-product firms, there is no 
sense in going further.”). 
140. If consumers are willing to pay $100 for the bundle of A and B when each costs 
$50, then if the price of A declines to $45, consumers should be willing to pay $55 for B. 
141. See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 81, at 509 (observing “‘sacrifice’ in one product 
can be immediately recouped (often quite legitimately) because it boosts profits in a 
complementary product”). 
142. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 
(describing government’s argument that Microsoft priced Internet browser below cost to 
preserve monopoly on operating systems).  
143. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(discussing Microsoft’s fear that Netscape’s success in browser market could enable 
development of alternative platform for applications development), rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 
34. 
144. Id. at 43. 
1722 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1695 
  
Microsoft’s conduct can be seen as a form of predatory pricing.145 
Microsoft’s development and marketing of IE cost Microsoft well over 
$100 million per year, but Microsoft gave away this product for free.146 
Microsoft itself referred to its browser as a “no-revenue product.”147 Giv-
ing away a product for free constitutes predatory pricing under any rea-
sonable definition of “appropriate measure of cost.”148 Even Robert 
Bork—not generally a friend of antitrust plaintiffs—described Microsoft’s 
conduct as a species of predatory pricing.149  
Microsoft did not recoup in the market in which the predation oc-
curred—browsers—but it did recoup elsewhere. Microsoft had no inten-
tion of earning profits in the browser market.150 Microsoft’s goal was to 
stop Netscape from encroaching upon the operating systems market.151 
Microsoft engaged in below-cost pricing in order to—in its own words—
“cut off Netscape’s air supply.”152 By engaging in predatory pricing in 
browsers, Microsoft succeeded in driving Netscape from the market and 
eliminated the threat that browser technology posed to Microsoft’s mo-
nopoly on operating systems.153 As Robert Bork explained,  
                                                                                                                 
145. The D.C. Circuit did not evaluate Microsoft as a predatory pricing case. 253 F.3d 
at 68 (declining to consider liability for predatory pricing because plaintiffs did not press 
issue on appeal). The facts of the case, however, illustrate how recoupment from below-
cost pricing can occur in adjacent markets. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (stating 
Microsoft “operated to reinforce monopoly power” in the operating system market by 
entering the browser market). 
146. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Maintenance of Monopoly: U.S. v. Microsoft, in Antitrust 
Revolution, 4th ed., supra note 81, at 476, 489. 
147. Id. 
148. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects 
of Standards Setting 87 (2004) (“In the standard-setting context, a number of 
commentators have suggested that, by bundling its browser product (Internet Explorer) 
with its operating system product, Microsoft essentially ‘gave its browser away for free’ and 
thereby engaged in predatory pricing.” (quoting Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, 
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason 
L. Rev. 617, 638–39 (1999)) (citing Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal 
Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 809, 873–74 (2000))). 
149. See Robert Bork, High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah?, in High-Stakes 
Antitrust 45, 54 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003) [hereinafter Bork, Last Hurrah] (“Microsoft’s 
campaign resembled price-cutting predation in that it gave price and other concessions 
(translatable into price) to those vendors it demanded stop dealing with Netscape and 
Sun, and it also had to increase its output of browsers and JVMs [Java Virtual Machines].”). 
150. See Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 490 (“[T]he Government introduced . . . 
documents showing that [Microsoft’s] zero (or negative) price for its browser was not 
considered a way to earn competitive ancillary revenues.”). 
151. Bork, Last Hurrah, supra note 149, at 50 (noting Steve Ballmer of Microsoft 
stated Microsoft had to expand into “Netscape’s territory lest Netscape encroach on [its] 
operating systems territory”). 
152. Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 489–90 (quoting deposition testimony of witness 
Steven McGeady) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153. Bork, Last Hurrah, supra note 149, at 50–51. 
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Microsoft was defending monopoly profits that made the ex-
pense of predation worthwhile. Even after the sacrificed fixed 
costs of developing the Internet Explorer, the company was 
earning supracompetitive returns on the monopoly it was de-
fending, while Netscape, forced to distribute its Navigator free, 
had no income in that market to cover its fixed costs. Under-
standably, Netscape gave up a contest it could not win.154 
In sum, Microsoft’s losses in the browser market were recouped in 
the market for operating systems.155 This example shows how a firm may 
engage in predatory pricing in one market in order to sustain a profita-
ble monopoly in another market.156 If courts focus exclusively on the 
market in which the price predation occurred, they may fail to detect the 
recoupment. 
b. Recoupment in Substitute Product Market. — Recoupment can also 
take place in the market for a substitute product. For example, in Brooke 
Group, the cigarette manufacturer Liggett had sued its rival (B&W) for 
predatory pricing in the market for generic cigarettes. According to 
Liggett’s theory of the case, Liggett had sold low-priced generic ciga-
rettes, which reduced the ability of makers of branded cigarettes to raise 
their prices. As a result, B&W suffered significant decreases in its profits. 
B&W needed to slow the sales growth of—and increase the price of—
generic cigarettes in order to slow or reverse its decline in profits for 
branded cigarettes.157 In response to the threat posed by Liggett’s low-
                                                                                                                 
154. Id. at 55. 
155. See Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 490 (“From the Government’s perspective, the 
preservation of Microsoft’s OS monopoly alone would permit recoupment.”); Steven C. 
Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, 
and Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617, 639 (1999) (discussing plausibility of 
recoupment for Microsoft). 
156. Network effects also played a role in the recoupment strategy. Network effects 
can reinforce a monopoly but cannot protect it forever. In this instance, Microsoft had 
monopoly power over the market for operating systems, secured in part through the 
network effects. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam). The network effects alone were insufficient to guarantee Microsoft’s monopoly 
position. So it engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts in order to undermine firms and 
products that represented potential long-term threats to Microsoft’s operating system. The 
network effects, in turn, facilitated recoupment. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 155, at 
639 (describing how network effects could make price predation profitable for Microsoft); 
see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The 
Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 Antitrust Bull. 715, 725 (1998) 
(noting investments in predation are more likely to be recouped in market with network 
effects). In short, the Microsoft case shows how a dominant firm in a market that exhibits 
network effects may engage in predatory pricing in order to prevent a rival’s (superior) 
product from becoming the industry standard. 
157. Brief for the Petitioner, Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (No. 92-466), 1992 WL 541265, at *17 (“Its unilateral 
investment in below-average-variable-cost pricing turned out to be $14.9 million, which is 
far less than the $350 million that it estimated it would forego by 1988 unless the growth of 
generics were slowed down.” (citation omitted)). 
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priced generics, B&W entered the market for generic cigarettes and 
priced below cost, while tacitly communicating the message to Liggett 
that if Liggett would raise the prices of its generic cigarettes, so would 
B&W.158 If Liggett succumbed to this pressure, B&W—along with the 
other tobacco firms—would be able to raise the price of branded ciga-
rettes.159 According to Liggett, B&W would recoup its losses from the ge-
neric cigarette market in the oligopolized market for branded ciga-
rettes.160 Thus, while the predation happens in one market (generic ciga-
rettes), the recoupment takes place in another (branded cigarettes).161  
In their argument to the Supreme Court, the defendants in Brooke 
Group tried to focus the Court’s attention on the market for generic ciga-
rettes, instead of the market for branded cigarettes where the true profits 
from the alleged predatory pricing scheme occurred.162 Their strategy 
worked. The Supreme Court did not appreciate how recoupment can 
happen in another market.163 The Court affirmed reversal of a jury ver-
dict in Liggett’s favor despite the fact that Liggett did, in fact, raise its 
prices as B&W had dictated.164 Even after B&W’s entry into the generics 
market increased the percentage of the overall cigarette market belong-
ing to generics, the average price of all cigarette sales increased signifi-
cantly post-predation.165 This allowed B&W to recoup its losses in generic 
cigarettes through supracompetitive pricing in branded cigarettes.166 
Brooke Group illustrates the principle that recoupment can take place 
in the market for higher-priced substitutes. Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court failed to recognize this possibility despite the fact that there is no 
legal reason the predicted recoupment must take place in the precise 
                                                                                                                 
158. See supra notes 31–49 and accompanying text (discussing Brooke Group).  
159. See supra notes 31–49 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 31–49 and accompanying text. 
161. Although I have characterized the recoupment as taking place in another 
market, the parties in Brooke Group stipulated that branded and generic cigarettes were 
segments of one market for cigarettes, not separate markets. Baker, supra note 125, at 595.  
162. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209 (No. 92-466), 1993 
WL 445371, at *18–*20. 
163. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2258 (“In 
Brooke, the Court omitted from its analysis any consideration of strategic factors such as 
possible gains from . . . other cigarette markets . . . .”). 
164. Professor Areeda noted that Liggett indeed raised prices in his argument before 
the Court. See Oral Argument at 10:56, Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209 (No. 92-466), available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_466#argument (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he losses, as B&W predicted, induced Liggett to raise its 
consumer prices, its list prices.”). 
165. See id. at 15:27 (“[F]rom the date when B&W entered the . . . generic business, 
to the close . . . of the record, the price of regular-brand cigarettes rose 67 percent[] [and] 
[t]he price of all generics rose 74 percent.”). 
166. Id. at 12:25 (“[P]rices are supracompetitive. And the maintenance of those 
supracompetitive prices on regular-brand product, was, in fact, the object of the predatory 
scheme.”). 
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market in which the below-cost pricing occurred.167 
c. Recoupment in Replacement Product Markets. — Courts also fail to ap-
preciate how recoupment for a predatory-pricing scheme can occur in 
the market for replacement goods. In this variation of predatory pricing, 
the monopolist charges a price below cost for original equipment, but 
charges a supracompetitive price for replacement or additional items. As 
a result, the losses from early predatory sales are recouped through high-
priced subsequent sales. 
The market for spark plugs illustrates this strategy. In Stitt Spark Plug 
Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., the plaintiff brought a predatory pricing 
claim, arguing that the dominant firm in the market for spark plugs sold 
its product below cost in the original-equipment market in order to cre-
ate brand name recognition that it could exploit in the market for re-
placement spark plugs.168 The plaintiff explained that by monopolizing 
the market for spark plugs used in original equipment (i.e., in new cars), 
the dominant spark plug manufacturer—Champion—could manipulate 
consumer preference in the market for replacements.169 Although the 
products Champion sold in the original equipment and replacement 
markets were identical, Champion could and did sell those identical 
spark plugs for a higher price in the replacement market.170 The 
Supreme Court had recognized this dynamic in the spark plug market in 
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, when it observed that spark plug makers  
furnished the auto manufacturers with OE [original equip-
ment] plugs at cost or less, about six cents a plug, and they con-
tinued to sell at that price even when their costs increased 
threefold. The independents sought to recover their losses on 
OE sales by profitable sales in the aftermarket where the re-
quirement of each vehicle during its lifetime is about five re-
placement plug sets. By custom and practice among mechanics, 
the aftermarket plug is usually the same brand as the OE plug.171 
Employing this strategy, Champion could take losses in the primary 
market, knowing it could recoup these losses in the replacement mar-
ket.172 The Fifth Circuit in Stitt Spark Plug improperly rejected the preda-
                                                                                                                 
167. See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 81, at 519 (noting none of the “reasons for a 
recoupment test suggests that recoupment must be in the same antitrust market as the 
sacrifice”). 
168. 840 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1988). 
169. Id. at 1254–55 (“[E]ngine owners tend to purchase replacement plugs of the 
same brand as the plugs that came with the engine originally.”). 
170. Id. at 1255 (“Champion sells spark plugs to original equipment manufacturers at 
prices well below the price of replacement plugs . . . .”). 
171. 405 U.S. 562, 565 (1972); see also Stitt Spark Plug, 840 F.2d at 1256 (“Champion 
is accused of cutting prices in one market—original equipment—in order to capture 
concurrent gains in another market—replacement equipment.”). 
172. See Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics 
of Antitrust Policy 144, 217–18 (1954) (discussing below-cost pricing in spark plugs). 
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tory pricing claim by defining the two markets—originals and replace-
ments—as one market in which no predation had occurred. The court 
held, “When Champion sets the prices for original-equipment plugs, the 
expected return includes not only the price paid by the original-equip-
ment manufacturer, but also the replacement purchases that probably 
will follow. Hence, any meaningful comparison of price and cost must 
encompass Champion’s sales to both markets.”173 In other words, because 
Champion was recouping in the second replacement market, it must not 
have been pricing predatorily in the original-equipment market.174  
The Fifth Circuit created a Catch-22 that makes predatory pricing 
claims impossible to prove. Under the court’s approach, because 
Champion was recouping its investment in below-cost pricing, it was not 
engaging in predatory pricing. Conversely, if Champion were not re-
couping its investment in below-cost pricing, Brooke Group holds that 
Champion did not engage in illegal predatory pricing. The recoupment 
requirement here operates to prevent all claims of price predation. Here, 
a monopolist was utilizing below-cost pricing in order to maintain its 
dominant market position for reasons unrelated to efficiency. This would 
seem to be quintessential monopoly conduct.175 Yet Stitt Spark Plug illus-
trates the phenomenon that if there is recoupment, as a matter of law 
there is no predatory pricing. 
Courts have applied this same analysis to predatory pricing of 
equipment, coupled with supracompetitive pricing of spare parts. For 
example, in Kentmaster Manufacturing Co. v. Jarvis Products Corp., the de-
fendant allegedly maintained its eighty percent market share in slaugh-
terhouse equipment by providing it at little or no cost to customers, 
while charging highly profitable prices for spare and replacement 
parts.176 Like the Stitt Spark Plug court, the Ninth Circuit in Kentmaster 
reasoned that the predatorily priced equipment and profitably priced 
spare parts “necessarily constitute a single product.”177 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
173. Stitt Spark Plug, 840 F.2d at 1256. 
174. It should be entirely irrelevant whether Champion was engaging in predatory 
pricing in both markets. It should be enough that it was engaging in predatory pricing in 
one market and recouping in another. 
175. It may be tempting to argue that challengers could copy Champion’s strategy of 
below-cost pricing on the original equipment followed by supracompetitive pricing on 
replacements. See Stitt Spark Plug, 840 F.2d at 1256 (“No action of Champion prevented 
Stitt from also pricing its product to original-equipment manufacturers with an 
expectation of return from the replacement market.”); Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 172, at 
219 (suggesting new entrants into markets could emulate practice of using below-cost 
pricing for original-equipment market and recoup losses in other markets). However, the 
entrant would have to be able to sustain losses for years until consumers needed 
replacements. This waiting period constitutes a barrier to entry unrelated to efficiency or 
product quality. 
176. 146 F.3d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). 
177. Id. at 695. 
2013] PREDATORY PRICING 1727 
  
held that the plaintiff’s theory of recoupment “is a straightforward ad-
mission that the total price of the single unit, [equipment plus spare 
parts], is not predatory.”178 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on the predatory pricing claim by dis-
counting the initial predatory sale of equipment and using the fact of 
recoupment—a necessary element of a predatory pricing claim—to hold 
that no predation occurred.179 
The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning for cases in which an 
initial product or service is given away for free. Ohio Bell Telephone 
Company published a telephone directory (the “white pages”) and 
through its subsidiary, Ameritech Publishing, Inc. (API), also sold tele-
phone listings for business directories (the “yellow pages”). Ohio Bell 
and API entered into a contract that required API to offer one yellow-
page listing free to each business telephone subscriber and provided for 
simultaneous delivery of the white pages and the yellow pages to the sub-
scriber. The plaintiff, Directory Sales Management Corporation (DSM), 
sold a competing business directory. DSM alleged that Ohio Bell was en-
gaging in predatory pricing by giving away one yellow-page listing for free 
and recouping that loss by charging a supracompetitive price for addi-
tional listings in its yellow pages. The Sixth Circuit rejected the predatory 
pricing claim reasoning that because API “has never sold first listings,” it 
did “not compete in the sale of first listings.”180 The court reasoned, 
“Predatory pricing requires that the Defendants sell a product at a price 
below cost. . . . The fallacy in DSM’s argument is that the Defendants do 
not sell first listings, they sell subsequent listings.”181 This sets up a para-
dox: If below-cost sales are priced so low that the product is free, then 
there is no sale, and predatory pricing is not implicated. The court 
missed the point: DSM would have liked to sell so-called “first listings” 
but could not enter this market because its primary competitor was giv-
ing the product away. The defendants’ strategy of pricing the first listing 
below cost was profitable because that first free listing locked in custom-
ers by creating path dependence, including coordinated billing and de-
livery of all directories, and the defendant could recoup its investment 
through sales of subsequent high-priced listings.182 
                                                                                                                 
178. Id. at 694. 
179. Id. at 696 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“Here, the initial ‘sale’ took place when 
Jarvis delivered its equipment to Kentmaster’s customers either for free or at below-cost 
prices. At that point, Jarvis’s prices were predatory. Unlike the majority, I do not believe 
that the complaint’s allegations about recoupment change this fact.”). 
180. Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 
1987). The court approved the district court’s holding that “no hidden charge exists for 
the first listing.” Id. at 610. This demonstrates that the first listing was provided at below 
cost. 
181. Id. at 613. 
182. The court also employed the single-market analysis used by the Kentmaster court, 
reasoning that “the first listing is not a separate product or market for the purposes of 
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The markets for spark plugs, slaughterhouse equipment, and tele-
phone directories illustrate both the economics of recoupment and 
courts’ inability to appreciate this reality.183 In the context of replace-
ment product markets, courts have defined markets in a way that puts 
predatory pricing beyond the reach of antitrust law because either (1) 
the plaintiffs cannot show recoupment and, thus, there is no predatory 
pricing claim, or (2) the plaintiffs can show recoupment and this, ac-
cording to the above opinions, proves that the price was not predatory. 
2. Recoupment in Another Geographic Market. — Recoupment can also 
occur in geographic markets other than the one in which the predatory 
pricing took place. A firm that operates in many markets may price below 
cost in just one or a few of those markets in order to acquire a reputation 
for price predation.184 Predatory pricing in one market serves as a warn-
ing shot for rivals in other markets. As Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp note, “the predation may ‘signal’ other incumbents what 
awaits their price competition or signal outsiders what awaits their entry. 
The predatory behavior can deter future competition before it occurs.”185 
In this manner, the exclusionary effects of the predation are not limited 
to the specific target of a particular episode of predation. This reputa-
tional effect can also limit the expansion of existing competitors.186 
A firm that operates in several geographic markets could overtly 
price below cost in one market in order to purchase a reputation for 
price aggression that it can employ in every market in which it competes. 
Jonathan Baker has explained: 
Suppose a chain store faces a non-chain rival in each of a large 
number of towns. The chain cuts its prices drastically in a few 
towns. When the chain’s rivals in those towns either exit or 
begin to compete less aggressively with the chain, the price war 
ends and high prices are restored. In addition, the chain store’s 
rivals in all the other towns, in which the chain did not cut 
                                                                                                                 
predatory pricing, and that to demonstrate predatory pricing DSM would have to show 
that the Defendants’ overall charges for advertising space in their yellow pages are priced 
below cost.” Id. at 614. 
183. See also Int’l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1396 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(“To evaluate [defendant’s] pricing structure fairly, it was necessary to consider not just its 
lowest prices, but all of its prices for the routes involved, for that is the only basis upon 
which the relationship between [defendant’s] charges and costs could be determined.”). 
184. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(“Under the government’s theory, American attempted to monopolize the four city-pair 
routes in question in order to develop a reputation as an exceedingly aggressive 
competitor and set an example to all potential competitors.”); id. at 1115 (“Post-Chicago 
economists have theorized that price predation is not only plausible, but profitable, 
especially in a multi-market context where predation can occur in one market and 
recoupment can occur rapidly in other markets.”). 
185. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 726, at 80. 
186. See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 108, at 42 (“[Predation] may be designed to 
mislead the warehouse store into cancelling plans to expand into neighboring markets.”). 
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prices, also respond by avoiding aggressive competition with the 
chain. As a result, prices also increase in the towns in which 
predation did not occur. 
In this hypothetical example of price predation with mul-
timarket recoupment, the firm developed a reputation as a 
predator by reducing price in a small number of markets. It in 
effect engaged in selective predation. The rivals in the markets 
in which predation occurred may have ended up crippled or 
destroyed, as the traditional predatory pricing story would have 
it. But rivals competing against the predator in markets in which 
predation did not occur were not injured directly. Most of the 
victimized rivals never experienced a price war but were merely 
intimidated by the threat of a price war into engaging in less 
aggressive behavior than they would otherwise have found most 
profitable.187 
These effects in other markets can make predatory pricing profita-
ble even if recoupment does not take place in the precise market in 
which the below-cost pricing occurred.188 
In deciding the recoupment issue, courts are not generally amena-
ble to proof of recoupment through reputational effects in other mar-
kets.189 Some courts have recognized the reputational benefits of preda-
tory pricing in theory, but have nonetheless rejected recoupment-
through-reputation arguments. For example, in Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., the Third Circuit acknowledged the theoretical possibil-
ity of reputational effects deterring entry after a predator raises price, but 
it discounted the argument, asserting that “[p]otential competitors will 
realize that at some point the predatory firm will be unable or unwilling 
to charge below-cost prices and absorb further losses, since nobody’s 
pockets are bottomless.”190 The court disposed of the reputational effects 
argument by assuming entry. But some dominant firms try to acquire a 
reputation for aggression in an effort to provide notice to all would-be 
entrants that entry will be greeted with predation.191 
                                                                                                                 
187. Baker, supra note 125, at 590–91 (footnotes omitted). 
188. See Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 
Stan. L. Rev. 695, 741 (1990) (“Long-term sales at, or below, cost, from a protected home 
market . . . to a low-price geographic market may benefit producers [under a variety of 
scenarios].”). 
189. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 727, at 97 (highlighting cases 
where courts declined to consider reputational effects). 
190. 51 F.3d 1191, 1202 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, 
Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2260 (noting in Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, 
No. 92-2243, 1995 WL 317307 (E.D. La. May 24, 1995), “district court rejected a 
reputation effect argument not because it was implausible, but because market conditions 
would have prevented such an effect”). 
191. See Dempsey, supra note 107, at 164 (“Any time that a low fare carrier 
attempted to enter Northwest’s monopoly markets, Northwest engaged in a predatory 
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The reputational effect for a predatory firm in multiple markets 
makes long-term recoupment possible for below-cost pricing that other-
wise appears unprofitable. Even if the predator fails to recoup in the spe-
cific market where it charged a price below cost, the signaling effect can 
outweigh the losses associated with predatory pricing.192 For example, in 
the early telephone era, Bell engaged in predatory pricing in Madison, 
Wisconsin, which allowed it to drive its local competitors from the market 
and to signal to the broader market its willingness to price below cost.193 
Although Bell was probably unable to recoup its Madison-based losses in 
the Madison market, its strategy was nonetheless profitable because Bell 
could now recoup in other markets.194 Professors Bolton, Brodley, and 
Riordan have explained that having openly engaged in below-cost pric-
ing in Madison (and a few other markets), “Bell, while maintaining low 
prices in Madison for several years, was able to raise prices to a su-
pracompetitive level in many other markets without inducing significant 
entry.”195  
The cumulative effects of a reputation for predation can be signifi-
cant. The reputation itself “serves as a barrier to entry, allowing the pred-
ator to increase prices in the recoupment market.”196 The reputation for 
predation can also deter venture capitalists and other lenders from fi-
nancing entry into any market dominated by the predator.197 And the 
reputational effects can deter reentry into any market from which the 
predator has driven rivals and subsequently raised price in order to re-
coup its investment.198 
                                                                                                                 
response designed to drive the low fare choice from the market, and to serve as a painful 
example to any other potential competitor.”). 
192. See Brodley & Hay, supra note 57, at 742–43 (“If other entrants are aware of this 
threat, the return from predation, spread across many markets and extended over time, 
could amply exceed the losses sustained in the demonstration effect market.”); Rapp, 
supra note 117, at 602 (“Under these conditions repeated predatory episodes pay off in 
total even though the defeat of a single rival in any one of them would cost the predator 
more than it would return in extra profits.”); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A 
Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284, 287 (1977) (“If by responding aggressively 
to a current threat of entry a dominant firm can give a ‘signal’ that it intends to react 
vigorously to entry in later time periods or different geographical regions, discounted 
future gains may more than offset sacrifices of current profit.”). 
193. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2309–10. 
194. Id.  
195. Id. at 2310 (footnote omitted). 
196. Id. at 2301. 
197. See id. (finding financiers may be discouraged from backing future rivals that 
may exit or fail to enter markets dominated by predator); see also supra notes 117–126 
and accompanying text (discussing predatory pricing and venture capitalists). 
198. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2302 
(“Reputation effects enhance the profitability of financial predation by making entry or 
reentry less likely. Future potential entrants observing the failure of the current entrant 
can only be more cautious in contemplating entry, whether or not they recognize the 
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A predator’s participation in multiple geographic markets can be 
particularly important to a predatory pricing scheme because the su-
pracompetitive profits earned in another market can fund the below-cost 
pricing in the market in which predation is taking place. Historically, 
Congress has been concerned with this possibility.199 The Supreme Court 
has noted that “Congress by the Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act 
barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business” through 
programs in which “profits made in interstate activities would underwrite 
the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.”200 Nevertheless, firms that 
engage in below-cost pricing in one market often finance the predation 
through cross-subsidization across geographic markets. Examples include 
airlines,201 tobacco companies,202 grocery stores,203 bread companies,204 
and dairy companies.205 
This ability to fund predation from another market’s profits in turn 
gives the predator visible staying power, which increases the credibility of 
its predatory threat.206 The reputational effects of price predation inure 
to the predator itself and not to any particular product or geographic 
market. Thus, below-cost pricing in one product in one region can pro-
duce entry-deterring effects in other product markets and in other loca-
tions.207 Furthermore, because the losses associated with limited preda-
tory pricing can be recouped in multiple markets,208 the amount re-
couped in each individual market need not be particularly great. Given 
this reputational dynamic across markets, the recoupment inquiry should 
                                                                                                                 
predatory nature of the price cutting.”); id. at 2265 (“[T]he incumbent’s past reputation 
as a predator deters future entry or reentry.”). 
199. See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1498 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(discussing legislative intent behind Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act to curb 
predatory pricing); Jordan, supra note 133, at 275 (examining legislative intent behind 
Robinson-Patman Act). 
200. Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1954). 
201. Dempsey, supra note 107, at 152. 
202. Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The 
Case of the “Plug War” and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 Bus. Hist. Rev. 33, 35–36 
(1982). 
203. Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 172, at 215. 
204. Moore, 348 U.S. at 118; Estes Kefauver, In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in 
America 139, 154–55 (1965). 
205. United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963). 
206. See Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 172, at 142 (discussing dangers from firms 
operating in multiple markets). 
207. See supra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (discussing recoupment across 
geographic markets).  
208. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2248 (“In 
reputation effect predation . . . a predator reduces price in one market to induce the prey 
to believe that the predator will cut price in its other markets or in the predatory market 
itself at a later time, thereby enabling multimarket recoupment of predatory losses.”). 
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not be limited to the individual market in which the predation took 
place.209  
3. Targeted Cuts and Fighting Brands. — The argument that firms can-
not recoup the losses associated with predatory pricing is often based on 
the assumption that the predator must reduce its price below cost on all 
of its sales. Robert Bork and John McGee argued that predatory pricing is 
not rational—and therefore does not occur—because the predator pre-
sumably has a greater market share; thus, when the price of the product 
falls below cost, the predator will suffer proportionately greater losses 
than the prey.210 According to this argument, as the predator succeeds in 
acquiring more market share, its relative losses increase as well.211 These 
scholars assume that the dominant firm must cut price across all units of 
its product, driving up losses and making recoupment all but inconceiva-
ble.  
Predatory pricing, though, need not require a dominant firm to 
charge a predatorily low price to all of its customers. The history of price 
predation shows that predators do not indiscriminately reduce price be-
low costs for all of their sales. Their strategies are more shrewd than that. 
First, predators engage in targeted price cuts.212 For example, Standard 
Oil targeted its price cuts to its rivals’ customers.213 Professors Dalton and 
Esposito have explained:  
Standard also employed a sophisticated and extensive intelli-
gence network. Its employees identified the shipments and cus-
tomer destinations of wholesalers of competing refiners using 
information obtained from agents of the railroads, retailers of 
refined oil products, and other employees of Standard. 
Standard maintained this information in an elaborate card cata-
                                                                                                                 
209. See Kwoka & White, Economic and Legal Context, supra note 120, at 181 
(“Even if ‘irrational’ when considered in isolation, such conduct may create a reputation 
for aggressive response that discourages any other competitors from initiating action. The 
value of that reputation justifies the expenditure in the initially targeted market.”). 
210. Bork, Paradox, supra note 20, at 149 (“Losses during a price war will be 
proportionally higher for the predator because he faces the necessity of expanding his 
output at ever higher costs . . . .”); McGee, Revisited, supra note 20, at 296 (“It will also 
cost the predator more than it costs his prey and probably an increasing amount of money 
as well.”).  
211. Bork, Paradox, supra note 20, at 149; McGee, Revisited, supra note 20, at 296.  
212. John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, The Economic and Legal Context, in 
The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy, 166, 173–174 (John E. 
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Antitrust Revolution, 3d 
ed.] (“[M]ore selective price reductions targeted against particular rivals will be relatively 
more costly to those rivals.”). 
213. Dalton & Esposito, Re-Examination, supra note 115, at 166 (“Standard typically 
did not cut prices throughout a market when combating a rival. Rather, Standard 
generally cut prices only to customers of its rivals, leaving unchanged the prices to the 
customers that it served.”); Leslie, Standard Oil, supra note 7, at 592 (“Standard identified 
those buyers who were using a particular seller that Standard had targeted for 
elimination.”). 
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logue that was then used to direct its sales force to capture or 
recapture the customers of rival refiners.214 
Such targeted price cuts can both drive out the target rival and send 
a message to other rivals (and their financiers) that the predator is will-
ing to suffer losses in order to drive competitors from the market. 
Second, firms have employed fighting brands, which are lower-
priced—sometimes predatorily priced—versions of a product. A firm may 
launch a fighting brand in its competitors’ markets while continuing to 
charge a higher price for its own name-brand product. The most famous 
fighting brand was American Tobacco Company’s Battle Ax, a chewing 
tobacco whose price plummeted below cost as American Tobacco in-
flicted losses on its competitors—and itself—in a bid to force its rivals to 
participate in a tobacco cartel.215 In addition to reducing price, American 
Tobacco engaged in an expansive advertising campaign for Battle Ax, 
particularly in its rivals’ home markets.216 American Tobacco’s losses dur-
ing the 1895 to 1898 period exceeded $3,400,000,217 but the firm suc-
ceeded. The so-called “plug war” ended when the major producers 
formed a trust that eventually controlled eighty-five percent of the mar-
ket, until the trust was dissolved by the Supreme Court.218 The fighting 
brand can be a new product or a reintroduced one, as when the vice 
president of marketing for North American Philips Consumer Product 
Division proposed that, should a rival enter the rotary shaver market in 
the United States, Philips should “kill this stone dead by introducing old 
models at very low prices.”219 Fighting brands have been employed by 
dominant firms in the markets for photographic paper, thread, and rear 
projection readouts.220 
Third, a monopolist can create and sell through bogus companies in 
order to conceal its targeted price cuts from its customers who might 
otherwise be angered by the price discrimination. For example, Standard 
                                                                                                                 
214. Dalton & Esposito, Re-Examination, supra note 115, at 161. 
215. See Burns, supra note 202, at 38 (noting “nominal wholesale price of Battle Ax 
fell to 13 cents per pound, a level apparently below the average cost of production, which 
included the 6-cent federal excise tax”). 
216. Id. at 38–39. 
217. Id. at 39. 
218. Ross D. Petty, Antitrust and Innovation: Are Product Modifications Ever 
Predatory?, 22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 997, 1008–09 (1988). 
219. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
220. Petty, supra note 218, at 1009–11. The precursor to fighting brands were so-
called fighting ships, which referred to steamship conferences which launched “‘fighting 
ships’ to offer a lower price on a competitor’s newly announced route in order to prevent 
the rival from obtaining cargo.” Id. at 1007–08. The strategy of fighting ships bears a 
remarkable resemblance to the predatory pricing claims against dominant airlines, which 
target the routes of new upstart low-cost airlines, while continuing to charge 
supracompetitive fares on their other routes. 
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Oil set up several bogus companies that represented themselves as inde-
pendent of Standard while charging a lower price—sometimes a preda-
torily low price—than Standard and its rivals.221 Tobacco companies used 
bogus independents, too.222 Under this scheme, the dominant firm 
continues to supply its loyal customers at the going rate, while the shell 
firm sells at a loss to its rivals’ customers. Once the rivals are driven from 
the market, the bogus independent firm simply vanishes, leaving all cus-
tomers dependent on the monopolist.223 
In sum, a predatory firm need not cut prices across its product line 
to all of its customers. It can target its cuts, while purchasing a reputation 
for predation. It can develop a fighting brand. Alternatively, it can con-
ceal its price predation behind a bogus shell company. Predatory firms 
have employed all of these tactics, which reduce the losses associated with 
predatory pricing and, thus, increase the likelihood of recoupment. 
4. Recoupment in Multifirm Markets. — Courts assume that recoup-
ment is impossible unless the predator can force all of its competitors 
from the market.224 Some economists further assume that recoupment is 
impossible unless the predator succeeds in driving its rivals from the 
market relatively permanently. For example, Jean-Jacques Laffont and 
Jean Tirole argue that “‘[p]redation corresponds to a sacrifice of short-
term profits in order to boost long-term gains by forcing rivals out of the 
market. Predation can be profitable only if it leads competitors to exit 
the market enduringly.’”225 Some courts have used these assumptions to 
construct bright line tests to create quasi-safe harbors in which recoup-
ment is legally improbable, if not impossible to prove. For example, in 
Rose Acre, Judge Easterbrook implied that recoupment is unattainable if 
the predator’s market share is below thirty percent in the market in 
which the predation took place.226 But this approach ignores the possibil-
ity of recoupment in multifirm markets. Even if competitors remain in 
                                                                                                                 
221. Dalton & Esposito, Re-Examination, supra note 115, at 169. 
222. See, e.g., Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2244–45 
(discussing American Tobacco Company’s use of bogus independents). 
223. See, e.g., Leslie, Standard Oil, supra note 7, at 594 (describing dissolution of 
bogus companies in context of Standard Oil). 
224. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 231–
32 (1993) (rejecting possibility of competitive injury through oligopolistic price 
coordination because plaintiff failed to demonstrate likelihood of recoupment). 
225. Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 Antitrust Bull. 321, 322 (2005) 
(quoting Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications 163 
(2000)). 
226.  A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“Cases frequently say that as a matter of law single-firm shares of 30% or less 
cannot establish market power.”). But see Goldstein, supra note 81, at 1773 
(“Easterbrook’s analysis of market share is questionable. He indicates that 30% is the 
minimum market share necessary to establish market power sufficient to recoup lost 
profits.” (citing Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1403)). 
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the market, recoupment can occur through either cartel or oligopoly 
pricing. In either scenario, the threat of predatory pricing can discipline 
the market, resulting in higher prices and, consequently, recoupment. 
a. Recoupment Through Cartelization. — The Chicago School and its 
adherents in the federal courts assume that when the predator attempts 
to increase price in order to recoup its investment in predatory pricing, 
any remaining competitors will bid the price down. For example, the 
Matsushita Court found it implausible that a cartel of Japanese manufac-
turers could recoup a joint investment in predatory pricing.227  
This line of thinking fails to appreciate the relationship between 
predatory pricing and cartelization. Predatory pricing can force other-
wise obstinate rivals to cooperate in a cartel by using a combined carrot-
and-stick approach in which the predator threatens to continue below-
cost pricing until the target accepts the invitation to charge su-
pracompetitive prices, a result that makes all market participants better 
off than either predation or true competition.228 Historically, dominant 
firms have employed aggressive pricing to punish “rogue” firms and to 
convince them to raise prices.229 Indeed, price punishment by a single 
player is relatively common among stable cartels. For example, when the 
diamond-producing nation of Zaire sold more diamonds than it had 
been allotted by the cartel, DeBeers—the leader of the diamond cartel—
punished Zaire by flooding the market with diamonds, driving the price 
down considerably. Zaire ultimately pleaded to return to the cartel 
fold.230 DeBeers’s actions reflect the predatory pricing dynamic: DeBeers 
took a loss in the short term in order to force Zaire to be a loyal cartel 
member in the long term. In some markets, the predator can target its 
disciplinary price cuts to a particular segment of the market in order to 
inflict maximum injury on the recalcitrant firm.231 In any case, the history 
of cartel enforcement mechanisms shows that cartel members, especially 
cartel leaders, use price wars—including below-cost pricing—to disci-
                                                                                                                 
227. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592–93 (1986) 
(finding it unlikely alleged Japanese cartel could maintain supracompetitive prices to 
recoup losses). 
228. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 727, at 86–87 (“The dominant 
firm may use predation merely to intimidate rivals from cutting price or increasing output, 
and even promising the victims oligopoly returns once they acquiesce.”). 
229. See, e.g., John D. Clark, The Federal Trust Policy 12 (1931) (discussing 
predatory pricing by shipping conferences); Fritz Machlup, The Basing-Point System: An 
Economic Analysis of a Controversial Pricing Practice 130–31 (1949) (discussing steel 
industry). 
230. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 515, 
619–22 (2004) (discussing DeBeers’s tactics against Zaire). 
231. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise 168–69 (2005) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise] (“Drastic price cuts by the oligopoly leadership are one 
form of discipline, particularly if the cuts can be confined to a particular market niche 
where they will inflict the largest amount of harm on the price cutter.”). 
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pline uncooperative cartel members.232 Examples include cartels involv-
ing shipping, steel, tobacco, vitamins, and computer memory.233 
Additionally, a firm may employ predatory pricing to gain leadership 
over a cartel. For example, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), a large agri-
business firm, charged a price significantly below its marginal cost in or-
der to coerce its rivals into letting it lead the global cartel in the amino 
acid lysine.234 Finally, predatory pricing can help stabilize an existing car-
tel by keeping out new entrants who would disrupt a collusive market.235  
The historical examples prove that competitors do not have to leave 
the market in order for the predator to recoup. Recoupment can occur 
through cartel pricing in the aftermath of predation.236 Unfortunately, 
courts do not appreciate the ubiquity or effectiveness of the predatory 
pricing as a mechanism for cartel creation and enforcement. This leads 
them to underestimate the likelihood of recoupment. 
b. Recoupment Through Oligopoly Pricing. — Even if the firms in a con-
centrated market do not engage in explicit price fixing through a cartel, 
a price predator may be able to recoup through oligopoly pricing. Firms 
in an oligopoly—a market with few sellers—can charge supracompetitive 
prices when the firms jointly recognize that they are collectively better off 
if they do not undercut each other’s prices. When price increases are 
achieved without actual agreement among the firms, oligopoly pricing 
does not fall within section 1’s prohibition on anticompetitive agree-
ments.237 
The Brooke Group majority opined that the losses sustained in preda-
tory pricing could not feasibly be recouped in an oligopoly market. After 
                                                                                                                 
232. See, e.g., Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, The Trust Problem 147–48 (rev. ed. 1909) 
(noting how Whiskey Trust in late nineteenth century used significant price cuts to force 
rivals to join whiskey cartel); see also Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 850 (5th 
Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (“Malcolm testified that one of his competitors told him that prices 
would soon rise but ‘they were going to go back down’ unless Malcolm raised his prices.”). 
233. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
261, 291–92 (2010) [hereinafter Leslie, Rationality Analysis] (describing how cartels use 
price wars to discipline rogue members). 
234. John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust 
Litigation, as reprinted in Antitrust Revolution, 4th ed., supra note 81, at 252, 259–60 
(noting ADM may have continued pricing below cost if Asian manufacturers had not 
acquiesced to joining ADM-dominated cartel); Leslie, Rationality Analysis, supra note 233, 
at 280–81 (noting ADM’s predatory pricing was part of strategy “to threaten the Asian 
firms by suggesting that if they did not divide the world market to ADM’s liking, then ADM 
would flood the market, drive the price down, and potentially drive other lysine producers 
from the market entirely”). 
235. See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 108, at 20 (noting potential disruptive effect 
to collusion scheme of entry by warehouse store into market). 
236. See Leslie, Standard Oil, supra note 7, at 583–84 (citing example of Standard Oil-
led cartel). 
237. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 
(1993). 
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acknowledging the theoretical possibility of recoupment through oligop-
oly pricing,238 the Brooke Group majority rejected this as “the least likely 
means of recouping predatory losses.”239 Although the evidence showed 
that the tobacco industry was controlled by a well-heeled oligopoly, the 
majority reasoned that any tacit coordination among tobacco firms would 
have been “unmanageable”240 and B&W “had no reasonable prospect of 
recouping its predatory losses.”241 Concluding that recoupment through 
oligopoly pricing was implausible, the Court ruled that B&W was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.242 
The Brooke Group majority’s reasoning and holding are flawed both 
factually and theoretically. Tobacco companies had historically secured 
above-market profits through years of oligopoly pricing, as the Brooke 
Group majority itself admitted.243 The facts of Brooke Group demonstrate 
how recoupment through oligopoly can succeed. While concluding that 
oligopoly pricing was an implausible means of recoupment, the Court 
acknowledged that following B&W’s alleged price predation, “the list 
prices on all cigarettes, generic and branded alike, rose to a significant 
degree during the late 1980’s. From 1986 to 1989, list prices on both ge-
neric and branded cigarettes increased twice a year by similar 
amounts.”244 Further, the expert evidence at trial showed that “these 
price increases outpaced increases in costs, taxes, and promotional ex-
penditures. The list prices of generics, moreover, rose at a faster rate 
than the prices of branded cigarettes, thus narrowing the list price dif-
ferential between branded and generic products.”245 Not only could B&W 
recoup through oligopoly pricing, it actually did. 
Abundant economics literature demonstrates the profitability of re-
coupment through oligopoly pricing, even considering the specter of 
free riding.246 Indeed, recoupment through oligopoly pricing may be 
more likely than recoupment through monopoly pricing. Professors 
                                                                                                                 
238. See id. at 225 (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate oligopolistic scheme “would 
cause a rise in prices above a competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for 
the amounts expended on the predation”). 
239. Id. at 228. 
240. Id. at 238. 
241. Id. at 243. 
242. Id.  
243. Id. at 213 (“The cigarette industry . . . has long been one of America’s most 
profitable, in part because for many years there was no significant price competition 
among the rival firms.”). 
244. Id. at 235 (citation omitted). 
245. Id. (citation omitted). 
246. See, e.g., Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2502–03 
(“While a predatory pricing strategy by an oligopoly may be partially undermined by free 
riding, it can still be profitable. . . . [S]ome or all members of the oligopoly may have an 
incentive to adopt aggressive policies, such as below-cost pricing, that contribute to the 
foreclosure of new entrants.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that if the goal of the predation is to 
cartelize rather than monopolize the market, then the target of the pre-
dation has more incentive to eventually cooperate with the predator than 
if the predator’s goal is to drive the target from the market entirely.247 If 
the target acquiesces by raising price instead of fighting back, “the preda-
tory period can be shorter, with less drastic and more selective price cuts. 
Since the predatory investment is less, recoupment need not be so large 
either as under monopolistic predation.”248 Using price predation to im-
pose oligopoly pricing and to discipline rogue firms is cost-effective be-
cause in many markets, the targeted rival would sooner engage in profit-
maximizing oligopoly pricing than exit the market altogether.249 Firms 
know how to read the signals of price predation as an invitation to en-
gage in oligopoly pricing.250 This is the language of business and, while 
some federal judges may not speak it, executives do fluently. 
5. Recoupment Through Distorting Test Markets. — In some instances, 
targeted predatory pricing can deter entry in multiple markets. Even if 
recoupment does not occur in the isolated geographic market in which 
the below-cost pricing occurred, the predatory pricing is profitable be-
cause recoupment is achieved across geographic markets, including 
those in which price did not dip below cost. For example, predatory pric-
ing can profitably delay a rival’s entry into the market when the preda-
tory pricing disrupts market testing. Before entering a new geographic 
market, many firms will first test the market to determine whether the 
expected profits from entering that particular geographic market exceed 
the expected costs. A dominant incumbent can use predatory pricing to 
deter or delay entry through the use of so-called test market predation, 
in which the “predator frustrates the prey’s market probe by openly cut-
ting price in the test market to keep the prey ignorant about normal 
market conditions.”251 The targeted price predation precludes the would-
be entrant from discerning that entry would be profitable.252 
Perhaps the most famous instance of test market predation is 
General Foods’s response to Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) attempted entry 
                                                                                                                 
247. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 727, at 84 (noting predator can 
more quickly convince price cutter to raise price than drive it from market entirely). 
248. Id. 
249. See id. (“[P]redation intended to create or maintain an oligopoly offers its 
victims a profitable escape—indeed, one that may promise even more profits than the pre-
predation market.”).  
250. See id., at 94 (“But the defendant’s response to the plaintiff’s introduction of 
generic cigarettes—introducing a closely similar or identical product and radically cutting 
the price—is a conventional form of oligopoly retaliation that is unlikely to be misread.”). 
251. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2248–49. 
252. Id. at 2311 (“The predator cuts prices to reduce the entrant’s sales in the test 
market, which prevents the entrant from discovering whether demand is sufficiently 
strong to justify its continued presence in the test market.”). 
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into General Foods’s turf.253 General Foods sold Maxwell House brand 
coffee in the eastern United States and dominated that geographic mar-
ket.254 P&G’s Folgers brand coffee was the market leader in the West, but 
was not available on the East Coast.255 To determine whether to expand 
east, P&G decided to use some eastern cities as test markets for 
Folgers.256 General Foods responded by slashing the price of Maxwell 
House coffee to below average variable cost for about a year in the test 
market cities (while maintaining its higher, profitable price in other 
markets).257 At times, General Foods sold Maxwell House coffee for less 
than the cost of the unprocessed green coffee beans.258 General Foods’s 
strategy worked; P&G declined to enter the Eastern market and made no 
other attempts for another seven to eight years.259 Although General 
Foods suffered losses for a year in a few markets, the strategy allowed it to 
reap supracompetitive profits in several more markets for many years. 
Most importantly for our purposes, General Foods probably recouped its 
investment in price predation.260  
Test market predation shows how to leverage the money invested in 
predatory pricing in isolated markets in a manner that allows recoup-
ment across many markets. Test market predation creates the impression 
that new entry will be unprofitable and thus dissuades entry on a grand 
scale.261 By delaying entry, test market predation hurts consumers who 
are denied both choice and price competition in the short term.262 
  
                                                                                                                 
253. Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 208–09 (1984) (dismissing complaint alleging 
General Foods used “its dominant position . . . to frustrate the entry of other regular 
coffee producers into certain relevant markets, and to prevent . . . competition . . . in the 
relevant markets”). 
254. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2314 (citing John 
C. Hilke & Philip B. Nelson, Strategic Behavior and Attempted Monopolization: The 
Coffee (General Foods) Case, in The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and 
Policy 208, 222 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989)).  
255. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2521.  
256. Id.  
257. Id.  
258. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2314.  
259. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2521. 
260. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2317 (“General 
Foods was able to maintain higher prices in other eastern markets. The resulting deferral 
of P&G’s entry in the East for several years should have enabled General Foods to recoup 
fully its predatory investments in the limited test markets . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
261. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2523 (“Under a 
test market strategy . . . the victim remains uncertain whether entry would be profitable 
and . . . may decline to enter.” (footnotes omitted)). 
262. See id. at 2522 (“[D]elayed competition hurts consumers just as much as 
permanent restraints during the period of delay . . . .”). 
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C. The Ramifications of the Recoupment Requirement 
The development of the recoupment requirement has been a boon 
for predatory pricing defendants. In adopting the requirement for sec-
tion 2 monopolization claims, the Brooke Group Court repeated 
Matsushita’s mantra that “‘predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful’” because recoupment is so unlikely.263 By 
requiring plaintiffs to prove recoupment while instructing lower courts 
that recoupment does not happen, the Court invited lower courts to sys-
tematically reject predatory pricing claims.264 Lower courts obliged, rou-
tinely granting summary judgment to predatory pricing defendants be-
cause recoupment seemed unlikely.265 The leading antitrust treatise 
notes, “By the stringency of its demand for proof of recoupment, the 
Court cleared the way for summary rejection of most predatory pricing 
claims.”266 
As a professor, Frank Easterbrook had long advocated that predatory 
pricing should not be illegal.267 As a judge, by inserting the recoupment 
requirement into section 2 predatory pricing cases, he effectively made 
his wish come true. Easterbrook’s reliance on the recoupment require-
ment to reject predatory pricing claims seems disingenuous at best since 
Easterbrook argued that recoupment was not possible.268 To say that 
                                                                                                                 
263. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 
(1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986)). 
264. See Benz, supra note 188, at 741 (noting it is “virtually impossible to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment” by predatory pricing defendant). 
265. See, e.g., Nat’l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 
(8th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for trucking company defendant that 
engaged in predatory pricing because there was no “dangerous probability” of defendant 
recouping losses stemming from its pricing); Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. 
Supp. 519, 528 (D.S.C. 1996) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ antitrust claims also fail because the 
plaintiffs cannot sufficiently show that Flow Measurement has an economically viable 
scheme for recoupment.”); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 66, 69 
(D. Mass. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because even if defendant 
was engaged in predatory pricing, there was no “dangerous probability” of recoupment). 
266. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 726, at 72; see also Jordan, supra 
note 133, at 292 (claiming, with one exception, “every lawsuit could have been decided for 
defendant on summary judgment based upon plaintiff’s failure to show that defendant 
could recoup its losses”). 
267. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 106, at 29 (arguing market competition, not 
courts, should deal with issue of below-cost pricing); id. at 36–37 (arguing net effect of 
predatory pricing is to reduce, not increase, price). 
268. See id. at 27 n.55 (“This shows the futility of a conspiracy to charge low prices; 
recoupment will be impossible.”); see also Baker, supra note 125, at 589 (“Price predation 
is almost always irrational, according to the Chicago School, because recoupment is almost 
always implausible.”); Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic 
Theory, 89 Geo. L.J. 2475, 2477 (2001) (“Paul Milgrom and John Roberts summarized this 
influence by observing that ‘a large fraction of the economics profession would argue 
that . . . predation is an irrational strategy for attempting to gain or maintain a monopoly 
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predatory pricing is illegal only when accompanied by a high probability 
of recoupment—while arguing that recoupment is not possible—is es-
sentially a one-two punch that legalizes predatory pricing. As Professors 
Areeda and Hovenkamp have explained, “any requirement that a plain-
tiff actually provide evidence indicating that the monopoly ‘payoff’ will 
be greater than the predation investment involves undue speculation and 
becomes a virtual rule of nonliability.”269 
The Supreme Court did not officially eliminate predatory pricing 
from the reach of the Sherman Act.270 But, given the low success rate fol-
lowing the imposition of the recoupment requirement, the cause of ac-
tion seems somewhat academic. If courts are going to require plaintiffs in 
predatory pricing cases to prove that a dangerous probability exists that 
the defendant will recoup its losses from below-cost pricing, then judges 
need to better understand the myriad ways in which recoupment can 
take place. In addition to improving their recoupment analysis, courts 
should consider whether to jettison the recoupment requirement alto-
gether because, as Part III argues, predatory pricing schemes do, in fact, 
inflict injury regardless of whether recoupment occurs. 
III. PREDATORY PRICING INJURES COMPETITION EVEN WITHOUT 
RECOUPMENT 
The sad irony of the repeated judicial misapplication of the re-
coupment requirement in predatory pricing cases is the fact that this el-
ement is unnecessary and inappropriate. Whether a monopolist recoups 
the money that it has spent to acquire monopoly power does not deter-
mine whether its anticompetitive conduct has harmed consumer welfare. 
Antitrust law cares about consumer welfare and should protect efficient 
competitors from illegal predatory conduct that injures competition. 
This Part explains how, even if there is no recoupment, antitrust injury 
may still result from the failed attempt at predatory pricing. 
                                                                                                                 
position and that it is, therefore, unlikely to be adopted in practice.’” (quoting Paul 
Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Econ. 
Theory 280, 280 (1982))); John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, Introduction to 
Antitrust Revolution, 3d ed., supra note 212, at 1, 2 (“On other issues, the Chicago School 
has spoken equally strongly. Price cuts almost invariably reflect lower costs and are 
therefore procompetitive. For price cuts to be predatory, by contrast, requires various 
stringent conditions that are unlikely to be met, and hence predation is unlikely to 
occur.”). 
269. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 724, at 38. 
270. The Court continues to claim that predatory pricing can violate section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 
(2009) (“[W]e have ruled that firms may not charge ‘predatory’ prices—below-cost prices 
that drive rivals out of the market and allow the monopolist to raise its prices later and 
recoup its losses.” (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993))). 
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A. Harm to Consumers 
Courts and commentators routinely praise the first phase of preda-
tory pricing, in which the predator charges a price below cost. Judges 
characterize this as a gift to consumers that antitrust law should be loath 
to penalize or deter.271 When characterizing predatory pricing as benefi-
cial to consumers, judges and scholars routinely fail to acknowledge that 
there are two separately identifiable categories of consumers who are 
affected by predatory pricing. The first group of consumers is composed 
of those who purchase the products during the predation phase. These 
consumers enjoy the benefits of paying a lower price for the product. 
The second group of consumers includes those who purchase the prod-
uct during the recoupment phase, after the predator has raised the price. 
The recoupment inquiry focuses on whether the predator will be able to 
raise the price high enough and long enough to recover all of the losses 
that resulted from the lower prices to the first group of consumers. 
Consumers paying monopoly prices in the post-predation period are 
injured even if the monopoly price is insufficient to recoup the invest-
ment in predatory pricing. Some commentators have suggested that “in 
order to injure consumers, the prices set by the surviving firm . . . must 
rise to a supracompetitive level for a time period sufficient to allow the 
predator firm to recover its investment . . . including the time value of 
money.”272 That is incorrect because the plaintiffs’ antitrust injury exists 
independent of recoupment. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have 
explained that “post-predation prices can be significantly supracompeti-
tive, thereby injuring consumers, and yet be insufficient in size or dura-
tion to provide full recoupment for the defendant’s investment in preda-
tion.”273 Consumers who pay supracompetitive prices in the post-preda-
tion period are injured regardless of recoupment because they are being 
forced to pay a monopoly price for the product. The fact that earlier 
consumers received a lower price is irrelevant to the fact that current cus-
tomers are being victimized by a monopoly that acquired its power 
through predatory conduct and not through efficiency or a superior 
product. Even if there is insufficient recoupment, there is still a monop-
oly for a temporary period and that violates section 2 if the monopoly was 
achieved through anticompetitive conduct. It is of little solace to current 
consumers who must deal with a monopolist charging supracompetitive 
prices that consumers in the past got a really good deal. If the plaintiffs 
are consumers who made purchases at monopoly prices and are suffering 
antitrust injury, why should it be a defense that other consumers—who 
are not plaintiffs—paid lower prices? This does not diminish the antitrust 
injury of the current plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                                 
271. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
272. Jordan, supra note 133, at 289–90. 
273. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 726, at 77. 
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B. Harm to Efficiency 
Predatory pricing also causes inefficiency, regardless of whether the 
predator recoups its investment. During the period of below-cost pricing, 
predatory pricing causes overconsumption as consumers base their pur-
chasing decisions on the artificially deflated price. This overconsumption 
is inefficient for two related reasons. First, below-cost pricing creates arti-
ficial demand for the product. In a properly functioning market, prices 
signal consumers about the scarcity and social value of a particular prod-
uct.274 Below-cost pricing sends consumers the wrong signal and causes 
resources to shift away from higher-value uses.275 Professor Williamson 
has explained that if consumers adapt their consumption and investment 
patterns on the mistaken belief that the (predatory) low price is endur-
ing, consumers can suffer net losses if they incur fixed costs based on 
their assumption that the relative prices were stable.276 The Supreme 
Court in Brooke Group acknowledged that “unsuccessful predatory pricing 
may encourage some inefficient substitution toward the product being 
sold at less than its cost.”277 As a result, predatory pricing shifts resources 
away from other, more efficient uses. 
Second, pricing below cost creates allocative inefficiency in the form 
of deadweight loss.278 In antitrust jurisprudence, deadweight loss gener-
ally refers to underconsumption caused by a monopolist or cartel reduc-
ing output and increasing price, which results in consumers being de-
nied access to a product despite their willingness to pay the efficient 
equilibrium price.279 Deadweight loss can also take the form of overcon-
                                                                                                                 
274. See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory 
Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213, 224 n.31 (1979) (discussing short-run allocative 
inefficiency in predatory pricing). 
275. See id. (“If price is less than short-run marginal cost, and . . . demand is . . . 
elastic, the price will not give consumers the proper signal about the scarcity value of the 
good. Thus, consumers will purchase too much . . . [and] too many resources will be 
devoted to producing the . . . good in the short run.”). 
276. Williamson, supra note 192, at 290–91; see also Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of 
Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 35 (2005) (“[B]elow-cost, nonexclusionary prices 
may harm consumers by sending false price signals that result in poor consumption 
planning by consumers.”). 
277. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 
(1993). In other cases, not involving predatory pricing, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that antitrust law cares about this type of resource misallocation. See Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347–48 (1982) (condemning maximum price fixing, in 
part, because it distorts resource allocation by discouraging provision of services and 
experimentation). 
278. See F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 869, 872–73 (1976) (discussing deadweight loss and concluding “short-run 
allocative inefficiencies associated with pricing below marginal cost can hardly be 
ignored”). 
279. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, 51 Antitrust 
Bull. 521, 524–26 (2006) (discussing concept of deadweight loss). 
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sumption when an inefficiently low price induces consumers to purchase 
products that cost more to produce than the buyers value them.280  
Finally, even failed attempts at predatory pricing hurt competitors 
which are more efficient than the predator. In some of the airline preda-
tory pricing cases, in which courts awarded victories to defendants, new 
competitors were driven from the market even though they had lower 
costs.281 Predatory pricing schemes injure efficient competitors that must 
defend against inefficiently low prices and, perhaps, exit the market 
temporarily.282 The exit of an efficient competitor, followed later by its 
reentry or the entry of another competitor in response to the defend-
ant’s post-predation monopoly pricing, imposes social costs.283  
If antitrust law cares about efficiency, then it should condemn pred-
atory pricing whether or not the predator successfully recoups its invest-
ment in below-cost pricing. The various forms of inefficiency caused by 
predatory pricing are not dependent on recoupment.284 
IV. RECONSIDERING THE RECOUPMENT REQUIREMENT 
At a minimum, judges should refine their recoupment analysis. This 
Part goes one step further and argues that it is time to abandon the re-
coupment requirement in section 2 predatory pricing cases. The re-
coupment element is unnecessarily burdensome285 and is too hard to 
                                                                                                                 
280. See Crane, supra note 276, at 35 (“[N]onpredatory below-cost pricing is 
allocatively inefficient, even if it does not lead to, or threaten, later supracompetitive 
pricing, because it induces the consumption of goods by some consumers who value them 
at less than the cost of production, creating a deadweight loss.”); Christopher R. Leslie, 
Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-
Fixing, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 243, 270 (1993) (“[D]eadweight loss also exists when trades occur 
that should not have.”). William Landes has also acknowledged that “below-cost pricing 
causes a deadweight loss.” William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652, 670 (1983). Landes, however, argues that this deadweight loss does 
not justify antitrust liability “[b]ecause the deadweight loss is a private loss to the 
predator.” Id. at 671. 
281. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(granting summary judgment to predatory pricing defendant while noting excluded 
competitors had lower costs). 
282. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 36 
(1989) (“[F]ailed attempts can impose large social costs. . . . [T]he attempt itself can 
impose enormous losses on rivals who must spend resources defending themselves or 
make costly exits from the market in favor of other firms.”). 
283. Some scholars fail to recognize this. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 280, at 678 
(“In the case of predatory pricing . . . the optimal penalty is zero when below-cost pricing 
is followed immediately by entry.”). 
284. This argument is further elaborated upon later in this Article. See infra Part 
IV.C (demonstrating whether or not anticompetitive behaviors prove profitable, they may 
nonetheless impede efficiency and harm consumers). 
285. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts 
and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 Antitrust Bull. 517, 539 (2008) (“One 
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accurately predict in many cases.286 Recoupment analysis requires a level 
of predictive ability beyond that required in traditional monopoly power 
analysis because courts must predict profitability and not merely power. 
The element invites and often requires rank speculation.287 While some 
scholars have advocated improving the recoupment element by making it 
more clear, more structured, or more expansive,288 tinkering does not 
solve the fundamental problem. The recoupment element is based on a 
false empirical premise and ignores relevant economic theory. It should 
be discarded outright.289 
This Part explains how eliminating the recoupment requirement in 
predatory pricing litigation would better serve the purposes of antitrust 
law. First, although the recoupment requirement is claimed to be neces-
sary to prevent false positives, predatory pricing law has other elements 
that are better suited for this task. Second, the recoupment requirement 
creates false negatives, which are also inefficient. Third, the recoupment 
requirement immunizes anticompetitive conduct, which should be con-
demned. Fourth, eliminating the recoupment requirement conserves 
judicial resources. 
  
                                                                                                                 
problem with the recoupment problem as Brooke Group articulated it is the great 
information demands it makes in close cases.”). 
286. See Phillip E. Areeda, Predatory Pricing, 49 Antitrust L.J. 897, 898 (1980) 
(“[T]he court will not often know enough to measure the height of relevant entry barriers, 
or to assess whether a given height would assure a successful predator of recouping his 
losses.”). 
287. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 285, at 539 (“Predicting the length 
and opportunity cost of a predation strategy, what the likely recoupment 
(supracompetitive) price would be, when entry might occur and how quickly it would 
move prices back to the competitive level is typically an exercise in pure speculation 
except in very obvious situations.”); id. at 540 (“[I]n extreme cases on both ends the 
relevant information might be readily obtained and a prediction fairly clear. But in the 
vast middle any testimony that profitable recoupment in the Brooke Group sense would or 
would not result is bound to involve significant amounts of conjecture.”). 
288. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2263, 2270 
(arguing for use of modern economic and strategic theories in proving predation and 
recoupment); see also Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2512 (“For 
example, Elzinga and Mills recommended . . . that proof of recoupment be based on . . . 
the likely present discounted value of profits, an approach that presents formidable 
difficulties of proof. A correct calculation under this approach would require projections 
of future profits and a knowledge of the predator’s capital costs.” (footnotes omitted)); C. 
Scott Hemphill, Note, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1581, 1608–12 (2001) (arguing for modifications to structural elements in, and 
excluding conduct from, recoupment analysis). 
289. Others have come to a similar conclusion. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, 
supra note 285, at 539 (“A better approach for litigation purposes is to abandon the strict 
recoupment requirement, but ensure that the market at issue is one that is structurally 
capable of being monopolized.”). 
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A. Reducing False Positives Through More Appropriate Filters 
The primary debate in predatory pricing is how to distinguish be-
tween legitimate price competition and predatory pricing designed to 
eliminate long-term competition. The recoupment requirement is un-
necessary to demarcate this line.290 Some commentators fear that without 
the recoupment requirement, ordinary price reductions could be found 
illegal under the Sherman Act.291 However, there are other requirements 
for liability that protect against false positives. These other elements are 
more appropriate filters, and the recoupment requirement can interfere 
with their operation.  
1. Monopoly Power. — Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns both 
monopolization and attempted monopolization.292 Each is a separate 
cause of action with its own elements. Illegal monopolization has two el-
ements under the Grinnell test: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in 
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”293 
In order to prove the first element, the plaintiff must define the relevant 
market in which the defendant operates and then show that the defend-
ant possesses monopoly power in that market.294 This is generally done by 
showing that the defendant controls a dominant market share and that 
barriers to entry prevent new rivals from entering the market and bid-
ding the price down.295 Illegal attempted monopolization has three ele-
ments under the Spectrum Sports test: “[(1)] the defendant has engaged in 
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to mo-
nopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power.”296 The third element of the Spectrum Sports test is similar to the 
first prong of the Grinnell test in that it requires the plaintiff to define the 
relevant market and to show that, as a result of the defendant’s anticom-
petitive conduct, there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will 
                                                                                                                 
290. See generally Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 108, at 8–14 (describing methods of 
distinguishing legitimate price competition from predatory pricing). 
291. See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text (discussing risk of false positives 
as rationale for recoupment requirement in predatory pricing claims). 
292. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
293. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).  
294. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51–56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam) (defining relevant market as Intel-compatible PC operating systems and 
finding Microsoft had monopoly power within defined market in analysis of first Grinnell 
prong). 
295. Id. at 51. 
296. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (citing 3 Phillip 
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 820, at 312 (1978)). 
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monopolize this market.297 This nominally third element is often ana-
lyzed first.298 In addition to these elements for liability, private plaintiffs 
bringing section 2 cases must also prove that they suffered antitrust in-
jury caused by the antitrust violation.299 
The first element of the Grinnell test and the third element of the 
Spectrum Sports test act as threshold elements because unilateral anticom-
petitive conduct, such as below-cost pricing, does not violate section 2 
unless the defendant has monopoly power or a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power through its anticompetitive conduct. Preda-
tory pricing is a way to satisfy the second element of the Grinnell test and 
the first element of the Spectrum Sports test. It is a form of monopoly—or 
anticompetitive—conduct. But given the market power requirement, 
which is a threshold element, the prohibition against predatory pricing 
only applies to monopolists and would-be monopolists. 
The monopoly power element reduces the risk that predatory pric-
ing claims will deter beneficial competition. Because section 2 applies 
only to monopolists (and would-be monopolists), the vast majority of 
American businesses are completely unaffected by section 2 predatory 
pricing law. Firms without significant market share can use all variety of 
loss leaders and promotional discounts without incurring section 2 liabil-
ity.300 If the predator reduces price below cost and injures its rivals, but 
fails to acquire the power to raise prices above supracompetitive levels, 
then its conduct may be anticompetitive, but section 2 liability does not 
attach.301 
                                                                                                                 
297. See id. (“In order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability of 
monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the relevant market and the 
defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.”). 
298. See, e.g., Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 407 (1984) (“[T]he [FTC] has 
taken the position that in attempted monopolization cases, the dangerous probability of 
success element should be evaluated ‘before proceeding to the other two elements.’” 
(quoting Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 346 (1984))). 
299. See supra Part I.B.2.b (noting distinction between injury to competitors and 
injury to competition in antitrust actions). 
300. For example, below-cost promotional pricing by a new entrant is legal under 
section 2. See Williamson, supra note 192, at 324 (“Such promotions may be the only 
effective way to overcome customer habit in industries where the product is differentiated 
by manufacturers.”); see also Jordan, supra note 133, at 270 (“[B]usiness managers . . . can 
use low prices, ‘loss leaders,’ or promotional discounts to increase their firm’s market 
share without running afoul of the predatory pricing laws, so long as their business poses 
no threat of monopolizing the market in which it competes.”). 
301. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Defendants managed only to drive prices down; they were never able to raise prices to 
supracompetitive levels.”); 3B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 807, at 449 
(“[W]hen challenged exclusionary conduct had ended three years earlier without 
increasing the defendant’s market share or forcing the exit of any competitor, a court is 
likely to see no dangerous probability of success.” (citing Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527 (N.D. Ill. 1991))). 
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The correct focus for section 2 analysis is market domination, not 
recoupment. Yet courts in predatory pricing cases sometimes confuse the 
two concepts by suggesting that they necessarily go together.302 For exam-
ple, the Eighth Circuit has articulated the recoupment requirement such 
that a defendant “‘must be able to create a real possibility of both driving 
out a rival by loss-creating price cutting and then holding on to that ad-
vantage to recoup losses; in other words, the price-cutter must be able at 
least to threaten domination of the market.’”303 This conflates two differ-
ent concepts because a predatory firm could illegally monopolize the 
market without recouping its losses. Recoupment requires something 
more; it requires the ability to earn sufficient monopoly profits to make 
the whole venture a worthwhile expenditure of funds. 
The confusion between market power and recoupment is particu-
larly acute in attempted monopolization jurisprudence. Attempted mo-
nopolization claims require the plaintiff to prove that there is a danger-
ous probability of a defendant acquiring monopoly power through its 
anticompetitive conduct.304 Pricing below cost does not implicate section 
2 unless the conduct “threatens actual monopolization.”305 In cases not 
involving predatory pricing, courts have articulated this element of the 
attempted monopolization test as requiring the plaintiff to show a “dan-
gerous probability of success”—success referring to successful acquisition 
of monopoly power.306 Through a sleight of hand, the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                 
302. See, e.g., W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(“[W]ithout market power, the predator’s recoupment will be thwarted by competitors 
who will offer their services at prices below the predator’s supra-competitive prices.”); see 
also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, 
Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) (linking recoupment and market power); Advo, 
Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1200–01 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). 
303. Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 
599 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
304. See Multistate Legal Studies, 63 F.3d at 1554–56 (analyzing dangerous probability 
of success in attempt case). 
305. Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413–14 (7th Cir. 
1989); see also Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 109 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (“[M]ere existence of predatory price cutting, and the extent of such conduct 
sufficient to justify a finding of dangerous probability of monopolization, are two quite 
different issues.”); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 597, 
601–02 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“[T]he Sherman Act had been interpreted to prohibit cut-
throat pricing only when such pricing posed ‘a dangerous probability of actual 
monopolization.’” (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 
(1993))). 
306. See, e.g., Gulf States Reorg. Grp., Inc. v. Nucor Corp., No. 11-14983, 2013 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14187, at *8 (11th Cir. July 15, 2013) (“A dangerous probability of success 
arises when the defendant comes close to achieving monopoly power in the relevant 
market.”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 441 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (“An attempted monopolization offense consists of: (1) the use of 
anticompetitive conduct; (2) with specific intent to monopolize; and (3) a dangerous 
probability of success.”); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903 n.13 
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Brooke Group essentially redefined “success” as “recoupment.”307 Thus, the 
plaintiff must now show not only that the predator is dangerously close to 
acquiring monopoly power, but also that the defendant enjoys a danger-
ous probability of recouping its investment in predatory pricing. Since 
Brooke Group, lower courts have interpreted the legal test in predatory 
pricing claims to require a dangerous probability of recoupment.308 
Yet an important distinction exists between a dangerous probability 
of achieving monopoly power and a dangerous probability of recoup-
ment. Antitrust law does not care whether or not monopolists are profit-
able; it cares whether or not dominant firms are acquiring their monop-
oly power through anticompetitive conduct unrelated to efficiency or 
competition on the merits.309 Predicting the probability of recoupment 
does not advance the goals of antitrust; in contrast, predicting the prob-
ability of monopolization is important because that will determine 
whether courts need to step in and prevent the creation of monopoly 
before it is too late. 
The solution to this problem is simple: Treat predatory pricing 
claims like other section 2 claims. Focusing on monopoly power—instead 
of recoupment—in both monopolization and attempted monopolization 
cases is the correct approach for several reasons. First, such an approach 
more correctly addresses the Brooke Group factors.310 Most of these fac-
tors—e.g., whether “the market is highly diffuse and competitive, . . . 
where new entry is easy, or the defendant lacks adequate excess capacity 
to absorb the market shares of his rivals and cannot quickly create or 
purchase new capacity”311—speak to monopoly power, not simply recoup-
ment.312 This muddles the antitrust analysis because the discussion about 
                                                                                                                 
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting there is no “liability for attempted monopolization unless the . . . 
elements of a specific intent to monopolize and dangerous probability of success are 
satisfied”). 
307. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–
25 (1993) (discussing dangerous probability of recouping, as opposed to dangerous 
probability of monopolizing relevant market). 
308. See, e.g., Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting 
Spectrum Sports requires “‘dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power’” but 
applying Brooke Group language of “‘dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in 
below-cost prices’” (alteration in Vollrath) (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224; Spectrum 
Sports, 506 U.S. at 447)). 
309. See infra notes 374–384 and accompanying text (noting courts do not inquire 
into cost-effectiveness of acquisition of monopoly power outside predatory pricing 
context). 
310. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225 (noting recoupment factors, including “extent 
and duration of the alleged predation, the relative financial strength of the predator and 
its intended victim, and their respective incentives and will”). 
311. Id. at 226.  
312. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2507 (“[E]vidence 
of anticompetitive effects can establish market power.”). The dangerous probability of 
monopolization element already examines the same factors that Brooke Group articulates as 
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barriers to entry is part of the first element of Grinnell: Does the defend-
ant possess monopoly power?313 Even in the absence of a recoupment 
requirement, courts must determine whether the absence of entry barri-
ers precludes section 2 liability.314 If barriers to entry are too low—
and/or other factors of recoupment are not present—this probably 
means that the defendant does not have monopoly power or a dangerous 
probability of acquiring it. Thus, there is no liability, regardless of 
whether the defendant engaged in below-cost pricing.315 But this analysis 
should take place in the evaluation of the monopoly power element, not 
through a convoluted recoupment requirement, which courts often get 
wrong.316 
Second, focusing on monopoly power—instead of recoupment—re-
duces the risk of judicial mistakes. Courts have much experience deter-
mining whether a defendant has monopoly power (or a dangerous prob-
ability of acquiring it), but are not equally adept at predicting recoup-
ment. The monopoly power element should suffice. The absence of mo-
nopoly power means that there is no illegal predatory pricing—not be-
cause there is no probability of recoupment but rather because there is 
no monopoly power, which is the first element of a monopolization claim 
under Grinnell.317 Courts should focus on the monopoly power inquiry, 
something that they do relatively well compared to their recoupment 
analysis. Determining the presence—or future likelihood—of monopoly 
power is something that antitrust courts do routinely since this determi-
nation is relevant to all monopolization and attempted monopolization 
claims, not just predatory pricing claims. This element is an effective 
screen against false positives in predatory pricing claims.318  
In sum, the monopoly power element is an appropriate filter for 
predatory pricing liability. Antitrust law cares about market power, not 
                                                                                                                 
relevant to recoupment, including “a defendant’s market share, whether the defendant is 
a multimarket firm, the number and strength of other competitors, market trends, and 
entry barriers.” Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l 
Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995).  
313. If the cause of action is attempted monopolization, then the “barriers to entry” 
discussion should take place when applying the element of dangerous probability of the 
defendant achieving monopoly power. 
314. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 724, at 42 (“[A]s Brooke and 
other Supreme Court decisions recognize, when entry barriers are not high, predation 
cannot be found on any price.”). 
315. See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Activities During the Clinton Administration, in 
High-Stakes Antitrust, supra note 149, at 11, 27 (discussing American Airlines case, in which 
American was awarded summary judgment despite having lowered prices). 
316. See supra Part II (discussing frequent judicial errors in recoupment analysis). 
317. The same reasoning applies to the third element of an attempted 
monopolization claim under Spectrum Sports. 
318. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2283 
(describing market power screen as “most frequent grounds on which courts have 
dismissed predatory pricing suits without trial”). 
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profitability. The probability of successfully monopolizing—not recoup-
ing—is the more appropriate standard. The former is easier to analyze 
and predict, is more relevant to antitrust’s goal of preventing illegal mo-
nopolization, and fits within the antitrust framework for attempted mo-
nopolization claims. In contrast, the amount of money spent to acquire 
monopoly power is irrelevant. What matters is whether—through charg-
ing a predatory price—the defendant has either acquired monopoly 
power or created a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power. 
Proper application of the monopoly power screen should eliminate the 
need for the recoupment inquiry.319  
2. Price Below Cost. — A predatory pricing plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant is charging a price below an appropriate measure of cost. 
That is the essence of predatory pricing.320 The price-below-cost element 
protects against condemning healthy competition.321 Those who express 
concern about false positives in predatory pricing incorrectly define a 
false positive as condemning predatory pricing when there was no prob-
ability of recoupment.322 That is not a false positive. If a firm acquires mo-
nopoly power through predatory pricing regardless of the probability of 
recoupment, then antitrust liability is a true positive.323  
                                                                                                                 
319. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 285, at 539 (“None of this matters 
very much if we abandon the strict recoupment requirement altogether and adhere to 
some more basic structural principles—namely, that monopolization requires a market 
with high entry barriers and economies of scale that persist over high output ranges 
relative to demand at cost prices.”). 
320. There is, however, a robust scholarly debate concerning whether above-cost 
price cuts can constitute predatory pricing. Compare Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost 
Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941, 942 (2002) (“[T]here is no compelling reason to 
restrict predation cases to below-cost pricing, as above-cost pricing can also hurt 
consumers by limiting competition.” (footnote omitted)), with Einer Elhauge, Why Above-
Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for 
Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681, 827 (2003) (“[A]ntitrust law should 
not recognize any claim of above-cost predatory pricing.”). 
321. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(citing below-cost pricing as alleged anticompetitive conduct distinguishing pricing 
scheme from healthy competition); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 
1198 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing how above-cost but below-market prices do not harm 
competition); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1440 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (expressing concern about condemning price cuts which merely stimulate 
healthy competition); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 
427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing below-cost pricing as “relevant and an extremely useful 
factor in determining the presence of predatory conduct”); Laitram Mach., Inc. v. 
Carnitech A/S, 884 F. Supp. 1074, 1080–81 (E.D. La. 1995) (discussing how above-cost 
pricing only excludes less efficient competitors).  
322. See supra Part I.B.1 (noting federal judges have interpreted recoupment 
requirement as proxy for below-cost pricing). 
323. In contrast, it would be a false positive if courts were condemning a defendant 
for predatory pricing when the defendant was not a monopolist, not charging a price 
below cost, or not injuring competition. 
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The price-below-cost element is often a more efficient filter to re-
duce the risk of false positives than recoupment.324 The fact that a domi-
nant firm has priced below cost is strong evidence that the firm’s deci-
sionmakers have determined that recoupment is likely.325 As Professors 
Areeda and Hovenkamp explain, “[i]nnocent firms do not ordinarily set 
prices below average variable cost, which entails both short-run and long-
run losses. With only a few narrow exceptions, such prices are irrational 
unless they are intended to destroy or discipline rivals in anticipation of 
later monopoly prices.”326 A factual determination that the defendant 
used predatory pricing to acquire monopoly power is strong evidence 
that the party in the best position to evaluate the probabilities expected 
recoupment.  
The recoupment requirement, however, sometimes nullifies the el-
ement of below-cost pricing. Courts use the recoupment element to pre-
vent consideration of the core antitrust issues of whether the defendant 
charged a price below its costs and, if so, whether this harmed competi-
tion.327 Using recoupment as a filter, once a judge decides that recoup-
ment is unlikely, “the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
regardless of whether it priced below its costs.”328 By treating recoupment 
as a threshold element that trumps other elements of a predatory pricing 
claim, courts have diminished the significance of the price-below-cost 
element, which is the definitional element of predatory pricing. For ex-
ample, Judge Easterbrook in Rose Acre used recoupment as a filter to 
avoid the price-below-cost inquiry even though the defendant charged a 
price below cost in order to drive the plaintiff from the market.329 Courts 
have sought to limit the plaintiff’s discovery to issues of recoupment, 
suggesting that discovery on price-cost issues should not be allowed until 
                                                                                                                 
324. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 724, at 38 (“Recoupment and 
price/cost relationships are ‘alternative’ screening devices, and the latter may often 
provide a quicker resolution of the case.”); Denger & Herfort, supra note 52, at 558 
(“[C]lear cost-related standards may be more susceptible to speedy resolution than such 
issues as market definition and market shares, entry and capacity factors . . . . [P]rompt 
resolution of the cost-related issues through articulation of clearly defined . . . standards 
may serve the purposes articulated in Brooke Group even more effectively . . . .”). 
325. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 724, at 38 (“When a price is 
clearly below average variable cost (or marginal cost) with no adequate alternative 
explanation, the firm’s managers have calculated that such a payoff was worth the risk. No 
court is in a better position to make this calculation than the firms’ managers 
themselves.”).  
326. Id. ¶ 727, at 96 (footnote omitted). 
327. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–25 
(1993) (focusing on recoupment rather than existence and effects of defendant’s below-
cost pricing). 
328. Austin, supra note 85, at 898. 
329. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1398 (7th Cir. 
1989) (noting expert evidence of below-cost pricing). 
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the plaintiff can establish probability of recoupment.330 In some in-
stances, courts have reasoned that “if the market structure renders re-
coupment of profits lost during the price cut phase difficult or risky, it 
may be unlikely that the seller’s price cut is predatory.”331 This is back-
wards logic, because if the price is below cost, then it is entirely inappro-
priate to use the probability of recoupment as a proxy for whether the 
price was, in fact, predatory. If anything, the inference should go the 
other direction: In the presence of proof of below-cost pricing, courts 
should presume the probability of recoupment because a rational firm 
would not incur the loss unless it reasonably expected to recoup. 
The pricing-below-cost element is not without problems, chief of 
which remains a lack of uniformity as to the appropriate measure of cost 
for predatory pricing claims. Courts and commentators have devoted 
much ink to what precisely constitutes “below-cost pricing.”332 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has ducked the issue all three times that it has 
been presented to the Court.333 Most circuits use average variable cost as 
their measure.334 A Supreme Court declaration of a single measure of 
cost for predatory pricing purposes would bring needed clarity to preda-
tory pricing law.335 Until then, whatever the measure of cost, the plaintiff 
must prove below-cost pricing with evidence, not “theoretical speculation 
that a defendant is pricing below that measure.”336 The price-below-cost 
element is not a perfect filter,337 but it does not need to be because the 
other elements discussed in this section also help screen out false posi-
tives. 
                                                                                                                 
330. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 54 (noting court in Rebel 
Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41 (D. Nev. 1990), limited initial discovery to 
market structure, excluding below-cost pricing from discovery). 
331. Irvin Indus., Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 974 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1992); 
see also Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401 (“The investment must be recouped. If a monopoly 
price later is impossible, then the sequence is unprofitable and we may infer that the low 
price now is not predatory.”). 
332. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable 
Cost Test, 39 J.L. & Econ. 49, 59 (1996) (discussing variability in defining average variable 
cost). 
333. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224–
26 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117–18 n.12 (1986); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584–85 n.8 (1986). 
334. 1 Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 278 (7th 
ed. 2012) (attributing courts’ preference for variable costs, rather than marginal costs, to 
relative ease of calculation). 
335. If courts could agree on the appropriate measure of cost, including what 
properly constitutes a cost, then it would be easier to determine the cost element directly, 
rather than rely on the recoupment element. 
336. Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995). 
337. See Baker, supra note 125, at 587–88 (“If cost is measured incorrectly, a firm 
pricing at or above cost might nevertheless appear to price below cost. This possibility 
cannot be dismissed, given the difficult conceptual and measurement issues surrounding 
the definition of cost.” (footnote omitted)). 
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3. Predatory Intent. — Where applicable, an intent requirement in-
sures that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant is charging a price 
below cost in order to eliminate its competitors altogether and to act like 
a monopolist in the aftermath. The Supreme Court has not explicitly 
endorsed this element for predatory pricing claims. In Cargill, however, 
the Court defined predatory pricing as pricing below cost “for the purpose 
of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in 
the long run.”338 Although the Supreme Court did not list intent as a re-
quirement in either Matsushita or Brooke Group, some courts have im-
posed this burden on plaintiffs alleging predatory pricing.339 For exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit has opined that “[p]redatory pricing differs from 
healthy competitive pricing in its motive: a predator by his pricing prac-
tices seeks ‘to impose losses on other firms, not garner [sic] gains for it-
self.’”340  
Some judges denigrate the intent element. In his influential Rose 
Acre opinion, Judge Easterbrook held that “the defendant’s state of mind 
[is] irrelevant.”341 He rejected predatory intent as an element in preda-
tory pricing cases because it is merely the “drive to succeed [that] lies at 
the core of a rivalrous economy.”342 Economist John McGee argued that 
intent was irrelevant because only effects matter.343 But this suggests that 
                                                                                                                 
338. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added). 
339. See, e.g., McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(“To withstand judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff must have other evidence, either 
objective or subjective, of predatory intent.”); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete 
Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting courts have adopted cost-based tests to 
determine presence of anticompetitive intent); Helmac Prods. Corp. v. Roth (Plastics) 
Corp., 814 F. Supp. 560, 566 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (attributing “intent to restrain or 
monopolize trade or commerce in the United States” requirement to antidumping 
statute). Not every circuit currently requires the plaintiff to prove a specific intent to 
destroy competition. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 
1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e now hold that intent is not a basis of liability (or a 
ground for inferring the existence of such a basis) in a predatory pricing case under the 
Sherman Act.”). 
340. Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 853–54 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) 
(quoting Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 111 (1977)) 
(misquotation). 
341. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401. Evidence of predatory intent included the president 
of the defendant calling the president of one of the plaintiffs and announcing, “We are 
going to run you out of the egg business. Your days are numbered.” Id. at 1398 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). For further analysis of this aspect of the case, see Goldstein, 
supra note 81, at 1768 (“Intent was a particularly thorny issue in this case because plaintiffs 
presented strong and direct evidence that Rose Acre Farms intended to drive its 
competitors out of business.”); id. at 1768–69 n.78 (“Rose Acre’s treasurer also admitted 
that its costs of production had nothing to do with the selling price of its eggs, explaining 
that pricing below cost ‘is the way to win in the long run.’” (quoting Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 
1398–99)). 
342. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402. 
343. McGee, Revisited, supra note 20, at 292. 
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courts should not consider recoupment, which tells us little about the 
effects on consumers of post-predation monopoly pricing. Instead, the 
recoupment element asks whether post-predation losses outweigh con-
sumer gains during the predatory period. 
The recoupment element can interfere with the intent element. 
Like Judge Easterbrook, the Court in Brooke Group essentially reasoned 
that evidence of predatory intent is irrelevant if the judge perceives re-
coupment as unlikely. The majority opined:  
[T]he record contains sufficient evidence from which a reason-
able jury could conclude that Brown & Williamson envisioned 
or intended this anticompetitive course of events. There is also 
sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that for a period of approximately 18 months, 
Brown & Williamson’s prices on its generic cigarettes were be-
low its costs, and that this below-cost pricing imposed losses on 
Liggett . . . . [However,] Liggett has failed to demonstrate . . . 
that in pursuing this scheme, Brown & Williamson had a rea-
sonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-cost pricing 
through slowing the growth of generics. . . .  
No inference of recoupment is sustainable on this record, 
because no evidence suggests that Brown & Williamson—what-
ever its intent in introducing black and whites [generics] may 
have been—was likely to obtain the power to raise the prices for 
generic cigarettes above a competitive level.344 
This view of predatory intent is shortsighted because intent evidence 
may show that the business calculated that there was a likelihood of re-
coupment. Firms are in a better position to make predictions about re-
coupment than federal judges who know little about the workings of the 
particular industry.345 For example, the documentary evidence in Brooke 
Group showed B&W’s predatory intent, including its recoupment calcula-
tions.346 
Still, some courts belittle the notion of “predatory intent” as an ele-
ment, protesting “the futility in attempting to discern predatory conduct 
                                                                                                                 
344. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 231–32 
(1993) (citations omitted); see also Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1097 
(9th Cir. 1998) (“If intent cannot substitute for the required element of recoupment, it 
likewise cannot establish an antitrust violation in the absence of evidence of below-cost 
pricing.”). 
345. See supra notes 325–326 and accompanying text (noting discrepancy between 
business knowledge of companies’ leadership and judges and therefore arguing for less 
stringent recoupment test).  
346. Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 
(M.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 
209; see also Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 
Antitrust L.J. 605, 611–13 (1994) (“[T]he evidence made clear that . . . B&W . . . outlined 
how a firm with only 12 percent of the market could engage in successful predation.”). 
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solely through evidence of a defendant’s ‘predatory intent.’”347 This 
reasoning is a red herring created by treating a single element as if it 
were the test for liability unto itself. This view would be persuasive if 
predatory intent were the “sole” element necessary to prove predatory 
conduct. But, of course, predatory intent alone does not give rise to lia-
bility.348 A claim for predatory pricing has many elements, as discussed in 
this section. Predatory intent works well in tandem with these other ele-
ments to distinguish good price cutting from anticompetitive price cut-
ting and to reduce the risk of false positives.349 
4. Causal Antitrust Injury. — Finally, a private plaintiff must prove 
causal antitrust injury. She must show that she has suffered an injury as a 
result of the defendant’s antitrust violation.350 This causation element 
can stop false positives.351 If the alleged below-cost pricing does not cause 
an anticompetitive effect that inflicts antitrust injury on a proper plain-
tiff, then antitrust liability will not attach. 
Competitors and consumers suffer their antitrust injury sequentially. 
The excluded competitors suffer antitrust injury during the predation 
period. When the targeted rival suffers lost sales or is driven from the 
market because of price predation, the lost profits are a form of antitrust 
injury, so long as the predatory firm is injuring competition in the mar-
ket overall.  
Consumers suffer their antitrust injury in the post-predation period, 
after the defendant has acquired monopoly power through predatory 
pricing and is charging a monopoly price. The higher price in the post-
predation period reflects the new monopolist’s attempt to recoup some 
                                                                                                                 
347. Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see 
also Int’l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1395 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1359). 
348. See, e.g., Hayes v. T.G. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 977–78 (5th Cir. 1979) (“A 
statement of intent to compete, however, even if perceived as a threat, is not unlawful. 
Such a manifestation of intent to triumph in the competitive market, in the absence of 
unfair, anti-competitive or predatory conduct, is not enough to establish an antitrust 
violation.”). It is important to apply the intent element correctly. See William S. Comanor 
& H.E. Frech III, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent, 38 Antitrust Bull. 293, 302 
n.30 (1993) (“As a casual look at the business trade press will show, businessmen often use 
sports or military language. Thus, aggressive memos are expected. Finding such 
documents, without more, is not necessarily evidence of predatory intent.”). 
349. See Goldstein, supra note 81, at 1790 (“For example, using subjective evidence 
of intent to supplement objective evidence such as below-cost pricing reduces the risks of 
misinterpreting either the intent or the cost figures.”). 
350. See, e.g., Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Under a claim of attempted monopolization by predatory pricing, a plaintiff must 
prove . . . causal antitrust injury.”). 
351. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2269 
(“Under Brooke and Matsushita, proof of an injury to competition, actual or probable, is an 
essential element of a predatory pricing case.”); Hay, supra note 116, at 362 (“Pricing is 
predatory if and only if it has an anticompetitive effect.”). 
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of its prior investment in predatory pricing.352 The public suffers antitrust 
injury whether or not the defendant is charging a sufficiently high price 
to recoup its investment in predatory pricing.353  
The recoupment inquiry has distorted the element of causal anti-
trust injury. The Brooke Group Court held: 
If circumstances indicate that below-cost pricing could 
likely produce its intended effect on the target, there is still the 
further question whether it would likely injure competition in 
the relevant market. The plaintiff must demonstrate that there 
is a likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would cause a 
rise in prices above a competitive level that would be sufficient 
to compensate for the amounts expended on the predation, in-
cluding the time value of the money invested in it.354 
The Court failed to recognize that raising “prices above a competi-
tive level” is sufficient to show antitrust injury; the additional require-
ment that the monopoly profits would likely “be sufficient to compensate 
for the amounts expended on the predation” simply protects illegal mo-
nopolists.355 It does not matter whether this act of charging the monop-
oly price will actually result in the new monopolist recovering its entire 
investment in predatory pricing; the current consumer paying the 
higher-than-competitive price will suffer an antitrust injury that was the 
direct and intended result of the defendant’s predatory conduct.  
The causal antitrust injury requirement helps to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate price cutting by ensuring that the plaintiff was 
actually injured by the predatory pricing. The recoupment requirement 
distorts the analysis by shifting focus from the victim’s injury to the pred-
ator’s profits. Further, it obscures the fact that the antitrust injury can 
occur in markets besides the precise market in which the price predation 
took place.356 
5. Legitimate Business Justifications. — Finally, in addition to the above 
elements, which serve as filters against false positives, predatory pricing 
                                                                                                                 
352. Professor Areeda recognized this injury in his argument before the Brooke Group 
Court. See Oral Argument at 19:54, Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (No. 92-466), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-
1999/1992/1992_92_466#argument (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The fact that 
the generic segment grew in size is, I suggest, more a response to the explosion in prices 
that came, rather than anything else. It is that explosion in prices that demonstrates the 
injury to consumers.”). 
353. Also, the public suffers antitrust injury from reduced choice even if the 
defendant does not recoup its losses. 
354. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225. 
355. I say “illegal” monopolists in the sense that their monopolies were not earned 
through greater efficiency or other competition on the merits. 
356. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (explaining recoupment in other markets); see also 
Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2267–68 (“By logical 
extension, the injury to competition and consumers may occur in either the predatory 
market or in a strategically related market where the effects of the predation are felt.”). 
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defendants can avoid liability by arguing that they had a legitimate busi-
ness justification for their pricing strategy. If an antitrust plaintiff is able 
to present a prima facie section 2 case, the defendant “may proffer a 
‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct,” which is “a nonpretextual 
claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits be-
cause it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer 
appeal.”357 This business justification defense exists for predatory pricing 
claims.358 Examples of possible legitimate business justifications for 
charging a price below cost include: “(1) compensating buyers for taking 
the risk of buying a new product; (2) expanding demand to a level which 
will allow the entrant to achieve scale economies; and (3) keeping prices 
at competitive levels, expecting costs to decline because of the ‘learning 
curve’ phenomenon.”359 Predatory pricing defendants can also argue that 
they were just “meeting competition.”360  
The business justification defense helps distinguish illegal predatory 
pricing from competition on the merits. Professors Bolton, Brodley, and 
Riordan explain:  
[The] business justification or efficiencies defense serves as a 
means of eliminating cases where below-cost pricing by a firm 
with market power is likely to be welfare-enhancing, rather than 
predatory. In these cases, the sacrifice of present profits 
through low pricing is justified for reasons other than exclusion 
or disciplining of rivals.361 
                                                                                                                 
357. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
358. See, e.g., Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 
1999) (“The key factor courts have analyzed in order to determine whether challenged 
conduct is or is not competition on the merits is the proffered business justification for the 
act.”). 
359. Carstensen, supra note 53, at 960; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 
F. Supp. 70, 80 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam) (“A sudden necessity of paying claims of 
importunate creditors might furnish a reason for sales at less than cost plus overhead.”); 
Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2278 (identifying 
“promotional pricing, learning-by-doing, and network externalities” as “three types of 
market-expanding efficiency defenses”).  
360. See Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (“It is not anticompetitive for a company to reduce prices to meet lower prices 
already being charged by competitors.”); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. 
Supp. 423, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (“A company should not be guilty of predatory pricing, 
regardless of its costs, when it reduces prices to meet lower prices already being charged 
by its competitors.”); United States v. Am. Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1966) 
(noting predatory pricing “defendants are entitled to show that their pricing policies were 
established, not from predatory motives, but for legitimate business purposes, including 
the purpose of meeting competition”). But see United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 
1120 n.15 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has never mentioned the possibility of 
such a defense under the Sherman Act. We therefore decline to rule that the ‘meeting 
competition’ defense applies in the § 2 context.”). 
361. Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Predatory Pricing, supra note 8, at 2274 (footnote 
omitted). 
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If below-cost pricing is truly defensive or efficient under the circum-
stances of the case, the business justification defense precludes antitrust 
liability.362  
In short, the business justification defense serves to prevent false 
positives, and could continue to do so in the absence of a recoupment 
requirement.  
6. Summary. — Eliminating the recoupment requirement should not 
meaningfully increase the risk of false positives. In general, whenever any 
element is added to a cause of action, the probability of false positives 
decreases because every element increases the likelihood that the de-
fendant will win, rightly or wrongly. However, the prima facie elements 
and the defenses in predatory pricing cases are sufficient filters against 
false positives. Furthermore, eliminating the recoupment requirement 
does not represent the wholesale elimination of one element. Rather, it 
is the mere restoration of an existing element—monopoly power—so 
that it more accurately reflects the purposes of antitrust law. Antitrust law 
does not care whether or not a monopolist increases its net profitability. 
It cares whether a monopolist acquires its power legitimately. 
B. Reducing False Negatives 
Courts in all areas of law must balance the risk of false positives 
against the risk of false negatives. While the recoupment requirement 
reduces the risk of false positives, it increases the risk of false negatives. 
False negatives are also to be avoided. Failure to condemn illegal activity 
can encourage it. In the context of antitrust law, false negatives under-
mine deterrence of anticompetitive conduct, which creates inefficiency 
and hurts consumers. In predatory pricing cases, false negatives mean 
that efficient firms driven from the market and consumers forced to pay 
monopoly prices have no recourse. 
Supporters of the recoupment requirement incorrectly believe that 
false negatives are not a problem in predatory pricing litigation. The re-
coupment requirement is based on the premise that predatory pricing 
does not happen.363 Some courts presume that predatory pricing does 
                                                                                                                 
362. See id. at 2276 (“The courts have generally upheld most types of defensive 
below-cost pricing as compelled by competition.”). 
363. See Kwoka & White, Economic and Legal Context, supra note 120, at 180–83 
(outlining argument “true predation is considerably less common than alleged” and “may 
be quite rational”); Trujillo, supra note 9, at 820 (“The Court’s recoupment standard is 
premised upon the theory that ‘predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more 
rarely successful,’ and, as a result, the prerequisites to recovery are purposefully difficult to 
establish.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986))); see also Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 108, at 2 (“[A]uthors 
who view predatory pricing as being extremely rare take a very different view from those 
who believe it to be a more common problem.”).  
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not occur.364 But predatory pricing does happen.365 Ironically, the case in 
which the Supreme Court announced the recoupment requirement rep-
resents one of the most visible false negatives. Brooke Group held that the 
alleged predatory pricing must not have occurred because recoupment 
was implausible.366 Yet, the evidence at trial shows that after engaging in 
below-cost pricing for eighteen months to force Liggett to raise its 
prices,367 Brown & Williamson succeeded in raising the prices of both 
generic and branded cigarettes, profiting handsomely.368 
The recoupment requirement creates false negatives, in part, be-
cause courts are not adept at predicting recoupment. Reliance on re-
coupment leads courts to incorrectly conclude that predation has not 
taken place. In the hands of judges unversed in the mechanics of compe-
tition and predation, recoupment presents an impossible-to-satisfy ele-
ment in some courtrooms.369 As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have 
explained:  
One downside of requiring proof of recoupment is that firms 
operating in markets where recoupment is thought impossible 
have a safe harbor. Once a market is observed to have low entry 
barriers or sufficient competition to make disciplined oligopoly 
unlikely, then any price in that market becomes lawful so far as 
federal antitrust is concerned. Firms in such markets are free to 
injure their rivals with unreasonably low prices.370 
In short, by making the probability of recoupment too hard to 
prove, courts are encouraging anticompetitive conduct.371 
                                                                                                                 
364. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Matsushita . . . created a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory 
pricing is unlikely to threaten competition.” (emphases omitted)); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. 
Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The [Matsushita] 
Court . . . [held] that the economic disincentives to predatory pricing often will justify a 
presumption that an allegation of such behavior is implausible.”). 
365. See, e.g., Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 105–
06 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing railroad’s below-cost bid as “predatory pricing incident”); 
Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2505 (citing examples); Rapp, 
supra note 117, at 596 (same).  
366. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 
(1993) (“Brown & Williamson had no reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory 
losses and could not inflict the injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit.”). 
367. Id. at 231 (“There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that for a period of approximately 18 months, Brown & 
Williamson’s prices on its generic cigarettes were below its costs . . . .”).  
368. See supra notes 162–166 and accompanying text. 
369. See Fox, supra note 73, at 607 (“[R]efusing to allow these findings, even though 
the jury had reached them at trial, further evidences the [Brooke Group] Court’s adoption 
of a burden of proof that makes a finding of recoupment all but impossible.”). 
370. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 50. 
371. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise, supra note 231, at 161 (“Second, while an 
overly aggressive predatory pricing law deters some legitimate conduct, complete 
nonenforcement encourages anticompetitive conduct.”). The problem of false negatives 
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C. Recoupment Is Irrelevant to Anticompetitive Effects 
The anticompetitive effects of predatory pricing—inefficiency and 
exclusion—exist independently of the monopolist’s profitability. A pred-
ator may become a monopolist but not recoup its investment in preda-
tory pricing. For example, the monopolist may have inaccurately pre-
dicted how long it would take to drive its competitors from the market 
and the monopoly price may be insufficient to recoup all of the greater-
than-anticipated losses.372 Or, the monopolist may have wrongly forecast 
the monopoly price. For instance, a predator could price below cost and 
sustain losses in anticipation that the monopoly price will be $100. If it 
later turns out that the monopoly price is $90, the predator may find that 
it is a monopolist but cannot recoup its entire investment in predation.373  
For other section 2 causes of action, courts do not generally ask 
whether the monopolist paid an irrationally high price to acquire its mo-
nopoly. The antitrust defendant cannot argue that it is not liable because 
it paid too much to drive its competitors out of the market. Three exam-
ples should suffice. First, in Lorain Journal, the Supreme Court con-
demned a local newspaper’s attempted monopolization of the advertis-
ing market by threatening its advertisers that it would cease doing busi-
ness with them if they also bought advertising on the new local radio sta-
tion.374 The Court never suggested that if the Lorain Journal lost money 
on its gamble, then the company would not face antitrust liability. In 
American Can, the defendant acquired its monopoly power by purchasing 
the factories of its competitors.375 It paid several times the market value 
for these factories and then destroyed many of them without even in-
specting them first.376 The district court held that American Can’s con-
duct violated section 2 without asking whether or not the monopoly prof-
its that American Can received outweighed the millions of dollars it 
spent acquiring that monopoly power through its aggressive acquisition 
                                                                                                                 
could be addressed either by making recoupment easier to prove or by eliminating the 
recoupment requirement altogether. Because, as Part IV.C, infra, argues, recoupment is 
irrelevant to anticompetitive effects, the latter is arguably the better course of action. 
372. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2512–13 n.98 (“A 
predatory campaign may last longer than the predator anticipated, resulting in net 
losses . . . .”). 
373. Alternatively, the predator may simply be irrational, without ever having a 
reasonable probability of recoupment despite attaining monopoly status. See 3A Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 48 (“[B]y making a showing of recoupment essential 
to predation claims, antitrust . . . limits condemnation . . . to those circumstances where 
the defendant was acting rationally. . . . [R]ivals can be injured by the irrationally 
motivated predatory pricing campaign just as much as the rational one. Why should they 
be denied recovery for the former?”). 
374. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–55 (1951). 
375. United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 868–70 (D. Md. 1916). 
376. Id. at 870–71.  
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campaign.377 Similarly, in Aspen Skiing, the monopolist drove its sole rival 
from the market by refusing to accept profitable vouchers issued by its 
rivals, but the Court did not require that Skiing Co. recoup the cost of its 
anticompetitive act of refusing the vouchers.378 In short, courts do not 
consider the profitability of defendant’s monopoly conduct in other con-
texts.379  
Courts are wise not to inquire as to whether the section 2 defendant 
made deft decisions: The inquiry is irrelevant. Courts should not ask 
whether or not the monopolist achieved its monopoly power in a cost-
effective or net-profitable manner. It is cold comfort to the consumer 
forced to purchase from a monopolist that the monopolist is not recoup-
ing its investment in illegal exclusion.  
Failure to profit should not be a defense to section 2 liability. This is 
particularly true with attempted monopolization claims because, by defi-
nition, the predator has not succeeded.380 Antitrust law does not gener-
ally recognize an unprofitability defense. For example, the Supreme 
Court noted in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. that “the test in § 7 
[of the Clayton Act] cases is not whether anticompetitive conduct is 
profit maximizing.”381 As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note in 
their treatise, “[t]he law embodies no general principle that the legal sys-
tem should not punish business conduct simply because the conduct is 
                                                                                                                 
377. Id. at 901–04.  
378. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605–11 (1985). 
379. See, e.g., 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 49 (“[I]n cases 
alleging monopolization by improper patent infringement litigation, the law does not 
require a showing that the value of any anticipated monopoly exceeds the cost of 
maintaining the wrongful suit.” (footnote omitted)). The primary exception is predatory 
bidding. Relying on its predatory pricing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has imposed a 
similar recoupment requirement in cases of predatory bidding. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318–21 (2007) (applying Brooke Group 
analysis to predatory bidding). This makes the exploration of the recoupment 
requirement more important, as what was once an anomaly in predatory pricing law risks 
distorting other areas of antitrust law. 
380. See Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“[A]ttempted monopolization claim necessarily involves conduct which has not yet 
succeeded . . . .”); Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(“Attempted monopolization under section 2 is usually defined as an unsuccessful attempt 
to achieve monopolization.”), abrogated in part by Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep’t 
Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985). 
381. 410 U.S. 526, 572 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, which governs mergers); see also Greene v. Gen. Foods Corp., 
517 F.2d 635, 646 (5th Cir. 1975) (“In any event, the degree of profitability or its lack 
resulting from an alleged antitrust violation should play no part in the determination 
whether the plaintiff’s suit should be barred on equitable grounds.”); cf. Robert L. 
Hubbard, Grunts, Winks, & Nods: What Meets the Agreement Element of a Section 1 
Claim?, 5 Sedona Conf. J. 99, 101–02 (2004) (“Section 1 does not require the defendant to 
profit. Murder, jay-walking, and pollution need not be profitable (or even economically 
rational) to be illegal, and neither should unreasonable restraints on trade.”). 
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unprofitable to the defendant.”382 This principle applies across business 
law more broadly.383  
Through the recoupment requirement, antitrust law has lost its fo-
cus in predatory pricing law. Interpreted properly, antitrust law does not 
care whether or not anticompetitive conduct is profitable; it cares 
whether or not anticompetitive conduct reduces consumer welfare. Anti-
competitive conduct can simultaneously reduce consumer welfare with-
out increasing a predator’s profits, as when the monopolist overspends to 
acquire its monopoly power. Even if the monopolist does not recoup, 
consumers forced to pay the monopoly price during the so-called re-
coupment phase suffer the same antitrust injury.384 A lack of recoupment 
does not negate the anticompetitive effects of predatory pricing. Preda-
tory pricing that succeeds in achieving monopoly power but fails to re-
coup is, in fact, harmful. It still inflicts antitrust injury on the excluded 
competitors and on consumers forced to pay a monopoly price in the 
post-predation phase. 
D. Eliminating the Recoupment Requirement Conserves Judicial Resources 
While Judge Easterbrook justified the recoupment requirement as 
efficient, the inquiry does not save judicial resources. Indeed, it compli-
cates the antitrust analysis.385 First, it requires parties and judges to obtain 
and evaluate data that is inherently complex.386 The recoupment require-
ment asks courts to estimate the monopoly profits likely associated with 
future monopolization and then to discount those profits to the net pre-
sent value of that stream of money in order to compare it to the stream 
of losses incurred during the period of predation. This in turn requires 
the court to determine the discount rate that should be applied, includ-
ing whether the discount rate should be fixed or variable. This requires 
an additional degree of complication that is not present in any other an-
                                                                                                                 
382. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 48. 
383. Other areas of law do not tie liability to profitability. If a pharmaceutical 
company spends $500 million to promote a drug that it knows is unsafe, that firm can be 
held liable in a subsequent fraud lawsuit even if it spent more on promotion than it made 
in sales. 
384. See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 81, at 518 (noting “unprofitable predatory 
scheme could be harmful”). Furthermore, antitrust cares about the acquisition and 
maintenance of monopoly power even if the monopolist does not charge a monopoly 
price. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[I]t is 
no excuse for ‘monopolizing’ a market that the monopoly has not been used to extract 
from the consumer more than a ‘fair’ profit.”). 
385. See Goldstein, supra note 81, at 1781 (“[R]ecoupment analysis is actually quite 
complex.”); id. at 1782 (“Easterbrook’s assertion that determining the probability of 
recoupment is ‘easy’ is inaccurate.”). 
386. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, Response, supra note 122, at 2512 (“Proof of 
recoupment can be exceedingly difficult and costly if it requires detailed quantitative 
evidence that the predator has actually recouped its losses or is likely to do so.”). 
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titrust cause of action. Some courts require that the plaintiff prove that 
the defendant can recoup its up-front losses plus interest.387 This compli-
cates the analysis even further since much of the information necessary 
to perform the recoupment calculation is difficult to get.388 
Second, the recoupment element necessitates more experts and 
concomitant speculation.389 Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note how 
“an overly strict [recoupment] requirement can involve experts in un-
warranted speculation in even moderately close cases and even require 
predictions about future technologies or customer preferences.”390 Be-
cause courts are not particularly adept at making these predictions,391 the 
inquiry into recoupment—even with this battle of expert witnesses—is 
fraught with peril. 
Removing the recoupment requirement could make predatory pric-
ing litigation more efficient by removing debate and deliberation over 
this unnecessary inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts adopted the recoupment requirement because they confused 
why a predator would price below cost with why predatory pricing is anti-
competitive. These are, however, separate issues. Antitrust law condemns 
monopolization through predatory pricing because it allows a monopo-
list to acquire market power for reasons unrelated to efficiency. Preda-
tory pricing is exclusionary regardless of whether the monopolist re-
coups. If courts insist on requiring proof of recoupment, then at a mini-
mum judges need to better appreciate the many ways in which a monop-
olist can recoup its investment in below-cost pricing. Further, courts 
should reconsider whether recoupment should be an element at all. 
Every element in any antitrust legal test should serve a purpose. The 
primary goal for each element in a section 2 monopolization cause of 
action should be to separate anticompetitive conduct from procompeti-
                                                                                                                 
387. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l 
Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1556 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting jury question exists as to 
whether defendant could “maintain that monopoly long enough to recoup any predatory 
pricing losses plus interest”). 
388. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 52 (noting recoupment 
calculation requires knowledge of size of post-predation market share and “market’s price 
elasticity of demand,” as well as “accurate predictions about the time new entry will take, 
the ability of surviving rivals to expand their output, or of customers to identify 
substitutes”). 
389. See Wagle, supra note 74, at 102 (“Prosecutors and courts alike will be operating 
with less than full information concerning, for example, a firm’s costs, its financial 
reserves, and barriers to re-entry or subsequent new entry.”). 
390. 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 75, ¶ 725, at 50. 
391. See supra Part II (noting courts tend to make mistakes when applying 
recoupment requirement). 
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tive (or competitively benign) conduct. Elements that increase the plain-
tiff’s burden without helping to distinguish between exclusionary and 
efficient behavior simply make it harder to establish liability and, thus, 
may protect anticompetitive conduct. 
Unfortunately, as the common law of antitrust has evolved, courts 
have sometimes created elements that are unnecessary and counterpro-
ductive. The recoupment requirement in predatory pricing litigation is a 
case in point. The recoupment requirement does not distinguish be-
tween anticompetitive and benign (or beneficial) conduct. Antitrust law 
punishes conduct because it is anticompetitive, not because it is profita-
ble. Recoupment makes predatory pricing profitable, but it does not 
make predation anticompetitive. Predatory pricing can be anticompeti-
tive and reduce consumer welfare even in the absence of recoupment. 
This makes recoupment an inappropriate element for an antitrust viola-
tion. 
The proper inquiry is the probability that the defendant will acquire 
or maintain monopoly power through predatory pricing, not whether 
the defendant will recoup the money it spent to obtain that monopoly 
power. 
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